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THE INSURANCE POLICY AS SOCIAL INSTRUMENT AND
SOCIAL INSTITUTION
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL*
ABSTRACT
This Article suggests that insurance policies are not merely
contracts but also are designed to perform particular risk manage-
ment, deterrence, and compensation functions important to economic
and social ordering. Recognizing this fact has significant implica-
tions regarding the manner in which insurance policies are con-
strued in coverage disputes. From this insight flow interpretative
consequences suggesting that policy construction can be improved by
not only performing traditional contract analysis of disputed policies
but also appreciating the particular function of the insurance policy
in question as part of the insurance product’s larger role as a social
and economic instrument or institution. Applying this broader
analysis, the Article examines in some detail the longstanding and
frequently litigated issue of how many “occurrences” have taken place
within the meaning of liability insurance, as well as examining
issues of “business risk,” “accidental” events, liquor liability exclu-
sions, claims for inherent diminished value of vehicles involved in
automobile collisions, trigger of coverage, and the workers’ compen-
sation implications of post-injury suicide. Appreciating the social
instrument status of insurance vindicates some judicial decisions
while exposing the shortcomings of others. 
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1. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971); see also W. David Slawson, The New
Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT.
L. REV. 21 (1984).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 8-9.
3. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Stempel, Insurance Policy as Statute].
4. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 31-103 (4th ed. 2005); EUGENE R. ANDERSON ET AL., INSURANCE COVERAGE
LITIGATION § 2.01 (2d ed. 2004); EMERIC FISCHER, PETER NASH SWISHER & JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 2.01-2.11 (rev. 3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2006); ROGER
C. HENDERSON & ROBERT H. JERRY, II, INSURANCE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS §§ 1.02-1.04
(3d ed. 2001); ERIC M. HOLMES & WILLIAM FRANKLIN YOUNG, REGULATION AND LITIGATION OF
INSURANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 1-161 (3d ed. 2007); ROBERT H.
JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25A[c] (4th ed. 2007);
1 PETER J. KALIS ET AL., POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE § 2
(1997 & Supp. 2004); LEO P. MARTINEZ & JOHN W. WHELAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INSURANCE LAW 59-240 (5th ed. 2006); 1 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN,
HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES §§ 1.01-1.03 (Aspen Pub. 14th ed. 2008);
JEFFERY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009)
INTRODUCTION
Long gone is the day when contracts were individualized agree-
ments, negotiated separately through personal interaction between
the principals. Almost forty years have passed since Professor
Slawson famously observed that 99 percent of the contracts in use
were in fact standard form contracts rather than customized
agreements reached after significant bargaining.1 This fact is widely
recognized, but legal scholars still debate the empirical or normative
consequences of this development. Recognition of the absence of
particularized bargaining over contract terms should logically
impact judicial approaches to standardized contracts used en masse.
But although the degree to which contracts have become “things”
has not gone unnoticed,2 and insurance policies have been anal-
ogized to statutes,3 these perspectives remain in the minority.
Mainstream legal opinion continues to characterize insurance
policies as contracts rather than products and to apply long-
standing classical or neoclassical contract doctrine to contract
disputes, often with no acknowledgment of the degree to which
insurance departs from the classic bargain model of contracting.4
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[hereinafter STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS]; ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE: MATERIALS ON
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND REGULATORY ACTS § 6.1-6.7 (1989); 2
ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE
COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 11.07 (3rd ed. 1995). 
One scholar posits that insurance coverage decisions have, if anything, become more
classical in their contractarian approach, observing that “[i]nsurance case law is increasingly
marked by judicial reliance on the principle of freedom of contract. In recent years, courts
have been inclined to enforce insurance policies as written ... and the result [is] that the
insurance company typically prevails.” Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14
CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 107 (2007). Professor Randall finds this reliance inappropriate because
of the “adhesive nature of insurance relationships” and the highly regulated nature of the
insurance industry. See id. Contracts of adhesion are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with
no bargaining over terms. See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630-31 (1943). This description
characterizes most insurance policies. See James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts
Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 995-99
(1992). Indeed, the term “adhesion contract” appears to have been first used in American legal
literature regarding insurance policies. See Eric Mills Holmes & Dagmar Thürmann, A New
and Old Theory for Adjudicating Standardized Contracts, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 323, 327
n.11 (1987); Edwin Patterson, The Delivery of Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222
& n.106 (1919). 
This Article does not argue that insurance policies are not contracts. To the extent that
insurance policies have to be classified as something, contract is the most apt category. See,
e.g., Little v. King, 198 P.3d 525, 528 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the prejudgment
interest rate applicable in uninsured motorist claim under auto insurance policy was the rate
applicable to contract actions rather than the rate applicable to tort actions). Despite being
(in the main) contracts, insurance policies also have the characteristics of products, statutes,
and, as outlined in this Article, socioeconomic instruments or institutions. 
In many cases, courts compound this narrow view of insurance by
taking a similarly narrow view of contract—focusing excessively on
only the text of the policy. More sophisticated courts take a broader
view of contract law and endeavor to correctly interpret the policies
at issue by reference to policy text, party intent, policy purpose, the
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5. The role of the reasonable expectations approach in insurance contract construction
is significantly more pronounced, or at least more noticed, than in noninsurance contract law.
But see Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 120 N.E. 86, 87-88 (N.Y. 1918) (noting that
meaning attributed to words in contract document should generally be that which a
reasonable person would attribute to the words).
 In the aftermath of Robert Keeton’s famous reasonable expectations articles and cases
adopting the doctrine, insurance scholars noted the product-like aspects of insurance policies
but did not develop the concept of insurance policies as products at length. Robert E. Keeton,
Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970)
[hereinafter Keeton, Rights at Variance I]; Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at
Variance with Policy Provisions: Part Two, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1970). In the wake of
Keeton’s seminal articles, much was written about the reasonable expectations approach to
insurance policy construction. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-
Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151
(1981); Symposium, The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations After Three
Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998); see also HOLMES & YOUNG, supra note 4, at 83-91
(discussing judicial construction and regulation of insurance policies with an “Implied
Warranty of Fitness” approach, excerpting C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227
N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) and Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa
1981) with only two pages of notes and commentary regarding the concept); 2 STEMPEL ON
INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 4.09; Eugene R. Anderson, Randy Paar & Sarah
Hechtman, The Submission of a Claim Under Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Will
Lead to an Adversarial Response by the Insurance Company, as Evidenced by Disputes over
Allocation and Advancement, 692 PLI/Comm 191 (1994); John N. Ellison et al., The
Policyholder’s Guide to Bad Faith Insurance Coverage Litigation: Understanding the Available
Recovery Tools, SK095 ALI-ABA 251 (2005); Holmes & Thürmann, supra note 4, at 365-75;
Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323 (1986); Peter
Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000); William Mark Lashner, Note, A Common Law
Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance
Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175 (1982); Joseph E. Minnock, Comment, Protecting the
Insured from an Adhesion Insurance Policy: The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Utah,
1991 UTAH L. REV. 837; Peter D. Rosenthal, Note, Have Bank Regulators Been Missing the
Forest for the Public Policy Tree? The Case for Contract-Based Arguments in the Litigation of
Regulatory Exclusions in Director and Officer Liability Policies, 75 B.U. L. REV. 155 (1995).
6. Regarding the “[h]ierarchy and [c]oordination” of these mainstream contract
construction factors, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981); FISCHER,
SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 4, § 2.06.
7. See generally Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why
Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171 (1995);
David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity
Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988). 
reasonable expectations of the parties,5 and public policy consider-
ations.6
Although some bemoan the supposed degree to which insurance
law diverges from contract law,7 the Grundnorm remains that
insurance law is largely contract law. Although this seems both
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8. See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 178-79. Prior to Keeton’s articles, see supra
note 5, and scholarly recognition of the reasonable expectations doctrine, courts on occasion
had found the product/warranty analogy helpful in resolving insurance disputes. See, e.g.,
Glickman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 107 P.2d 252, 256 (Cal. 1940); State Sec. Life Ins. Co. v.
Kintner, 185 N.E.2d 527, 531-33 (Ind. 1962) (Arterburn, C.J., concurring).
The prospect of C & J Fertilizer opening the door to sustained judicial examination of
whether an insurance policy was fit for its intended purpose encountered a setback when the
Iowa Supreme Court curtailed the use and breadth of the reasonable expectations approach
to contract construction in Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d at 112-14. This was part of the general
“counter-revolution” against the strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine
associated with Professor Keeton’s famous article. See Keeton, Rights at Variance I, supra
note 5; see also 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 4.09[D][4]; Rahdert,
supra note 5, at 323.
 The tide against a strong form of the reasonable expectations doctrine, one that would even
trump clear but problematic policy language, also tended to pull back the possible use of a
breach of warranty or product defect approach to construction. Nearly thirty-five years after
it was rendered, C & J Fertilizer remains the insurance coverage case that most directly
addresses the insurance policy as a product and the insurer’s promise as akin to a
manufacturer’s warranty; however, other cases have alluded to this aspect of C & J Fertilizer.
See, e.g., Carper v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 1985); Batton v.
Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 736 P.2d 2, 6 (Ariz. 1987); Estrin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 424 n.10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see also HENDERSON & JERRY, supra
note 4, at 18 n.1 (noting that contracts scholar Samuel Williston analogized insurance policies
to chattels); 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 34, 36-37
(Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1963) (“The typical [insurance policyholder] buys ‘protection’
much as he buys groceries.... [Although] for most purposes, insurance must still be considered
a contract between insurer and insured ... it is a very special type of contract [that may] ...
eventually emerge as a new and special form of chattel, or perhaps, quasi-chattel.”). 
9. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance
Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813 (2009) [hereinafter Stempel, Insurance
Policy as Thing]. 
10. See Stempel, Insurance Policy as Statute, supra note 3, at 8.
correct—if one is forced to select a single category in which to place
insurance—and unlikely to change, alternative characterizations
and their resulting perspectives can illuminate the nature of
insurance policies and the correct resolution of insurance policy
disputes. In cases and commentary, insurance policies have been
episodically analogized to products for some time,8 with growing
attraction to the teachings of this perspective.9 In addition, the most
common insurance policies are produced in a manner similar to
private legislation and share similarities with statutes.10
In this Article, I wish to add a further characterization to the
discussion of the nature of insurance policies and an additional
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11. See RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 43-65 (2003) (noting
degree to which requirements for obtaining insurance and ground rules set by insurers shape
behavior). See generally KENNETH S.ABRAHAM,THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008) (noting degree to which scope of available
liability insurance coverage has shaped tort system); Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort
Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J.
1, 4 (2005) (“[N]egotiations over the boundaries of liability insurance coverage (which appears
nowhere in tort law on the books) drive tort law in action.”). As summarized by Professor
Baker, insurance is a de facto element of tort liability because, without some source of
recoverable funds, attorneys will be reluctant to take even a meritorious plaintiff’s case.
Insurance also acts as a de facto cap on damages. Baker, supra, at 3. In addition, claims will
be styled in the manner most likely to maximize insurance coverage, with insurers playing
a major role in the conduct of litigation due to the insurers’ control of the defense of most tort
actions. See id. at 3-13. But see JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 4-5, 43-125 (2004)
(tending to see development of expanded legal rights of recovery as preceding insurance and
spurred by magnitude of injury problems and consequences rather than by increased
availability of coverage); JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN
HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 211-78 (2007) (examining other factors in development of
modern tort law; focusing on organizational efforts of plaintiff’s trial bar, its alliance with
elements of academic community, and increasing rights consciousness of the American public
during the twentieth century). To grossly oversimplify, Professor Witt tends to see tort more
as the “egg” whereas Professor Baker more often sees tort as the “chicken” produced as a
result of the insurance “egg.” 
interpretative approach to the construction and application of
insurance policies. In addition to functioning as contracts, products,
and statutes, insurance policies exist as social institutions or social
instruments that serve important, particularized functions in
modern society—often acting as adjunct arms of governance and
reflecting social and commercial norms.11 Appreciating this aspect
of insurance policies can better inform courts in assessing the
meaning of disputed policies and improve insurance coverage
litigation outcomes.
I. THE CONCEPT OF THE INSURANCE POLICY AS SOCIAL INSTRUMENT
AND SOCIOECONOMIC INSTITUTION
The insurance policy is created and designed to play a particular
role in social and economic activity. The concept I am advancing
could accurately be termed the insurance policy as social instru-
ment, business instrument, commercial instrument, economic
instrument, public policy instrument, or even political instrument.
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12. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, app. A (noting and summarizing major industry-
wide revisions of the basic commercial general liability (CGL) form); Aviva Abramovsky,
Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 375-77 (2008-2009). The Supreme
Court confronted the allegedly nefarious involvement of reinsurers in the revision of the CGL
form in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, involving an antitrust action by nineteen
state attorneys general who alleged that four major insurers acted in concert with major
reinsurers, particularly Lloyd’s of London syndicates, and pressured the Insurance Services
Office (ISD) to revise basic CGL policy by adopting a “claims-made” trigger thought to better
protect insurers from risk of long-tale injuries developing over time. 504 U.S. 764, 770-76
(1992); E. W. SAWYER, COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY INSURANCE 11-18, 42-53 (1943) (describing
gestation of the CGL policy and liability insurers’ coordinated effort to develop the
standardized CGL policy); see also ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 171-80 (describing evolution
of CGL policy and personal liability component of homeowners insurance). But see Baker,
supra note 11, at 13 & n.36 (noting that insurers also sell, primarily to low income
policyholders, basic property “dwelling” coverage without personal liability insurance found
in homeowners coverage); Tom Baker & Karen McElrath, Whose Safety Net? Home Insurance
and Inequality, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 235 (1996) (same).
13. See Stempel, Insurance Policy as Statute, supra note 3 (noting circumstances in which
insurers respond to policyholder or broker requests for revision of scope of standard form
policy coverage); infra text accompanying notes 30-38; see, e.g., O’Shaughnessy v. Smuckler
Corp., 543 N.W.2d 99, 104-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (describing exception to exclusion for
damage claims arising out of policyholder’s own defective work if work at issue was done by
subcontractor, constituting a major concession to general contractor policyholders);
Kalchthaler v. Keller Constr. Co., 591 N.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (same).
14. Accord GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 628-49
(9th ed. 2005); JAMES S. TRIESCHMANN ET AL., RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 494-511
(12th ed. 2005); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND
INSURANCE 92-120 (8th ed. 1999); Randall, supra note 4, at 107 (describing insurance as
“highly regulated industry”); see MARK S.DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 107-47 (8th ed. 2005) (noting pervasiveness, rationale, and types of insurance
regulation and suggesting that “if the insurance market were left unregulated it probably
would not maximize consumer welfare”); FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 4, §§ 3.01-
3.02 (describing system of insurance regulation and excerpting illustrative cases); HENDERSON
& JERRY, supra note 4, § 3.01.
All of these descriptions would essentially be accurate characteriza-
tions of my use and conception of the term. Standard types of
insurance policies are designed by the insurance industry, which
includes excess insurers and reinsurers,12 with varying degrees of
consultation, interaction, and development with respect to the
policyholder and brokerage community.13 Standard form policies and
insurance itself are also more heavily regulated than most contrac-
tual endeavors or commercial arrangements.14 In drafting insurance
policies, the insurance industry also engages in de facto dialogue
with the judicial system, sometimes “overruling” judicial determina-
tions with which it disagrees or effectively acquiescing to judicial
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15. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 222-23 (“[Insurers] may ... respond [to legal
developments] in either of two very different ways. In most situations, the market meets the
demand for insurance against the new liability by extending coverage to the new potential
defendants, or to the newly relevant causes of loss.... [But] [s]ometimes insurers cannot, or
will not, provide insurance against a new liability.”). The exclusion of pollution liability
coverage is an example of the latter reaction. Id.
16. See id. at 173-97, 222-23 (reviewing instances in which expansion of available
insurance encouraged expansion of liability rules and vice versa); see also id. at 223 (“[W]here
civil liability goes, liability insurance will often, but not always, follow.... The insurance
market has proved remarkably capable of covering risks that insurers had previously been
concerned would pose ... problems, albeit sometimes without the levels of profit that insurers
considered appropriate.”).
17. Accord id. at 177 (“[H]omeowners were in effect required to purchase [residential
property insurance].”); see MARTIN F. GRACE ET AL., CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: CONSUMER
DEMAND, MARKETS AND REGULATION 83 & n.14 (2003) (assuming, for purposes of analyzing
demand in the market for homeowners insurance, that “homeowners insurance ... is
essentially mandatory”).
decisions it initially opposed.15 Insurers seek to further sales of their
products by working to spread coverage into different corners of
society—sometimes with the tacit blessing of judicial, political, and
business actors.16
Insurance policies serve a function in the social ordering of
personal and economic activity. Although this statement is perhaps
true for any contract, commonly sold insurance policies are particu-
larly important in that they serve as part of the infrastructure by
which such activity is conducted, at least in the United States and
other industrialized countries. Although the activity involved could,
in theory, be conducted in the absence of insurance—and to a sig-
nificant extent is conducted without insurance in less developed
countries—insurance is integral to business and social activities and
practically necessary to modern industrial society. Anyone needing
a mortgage to buy a home, for example, is practically required to
purchase homeowners insurance, at least in an amount equal to or
greater than the lender’s financial exposure.17 In perhaps the best
known example, every state effectively requires auto insurance in
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18. See DORFMAN, supra note 14, at 222 (describing financial responsibility laws that
require drivers to purchase liability insurance or prove their financial responsibility to retain
a driver’s license or to register their vehicle); REJDA, supra note 14, at 316-19; TRIESCHMANN
ET AL., supra note 14, at 241-45; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 539-41 (reviewing
the history and current status of compulsory automobile liability insurance laws in the fifty
states). Strictly speaking, someone wanting to license a vehicle does not have to buy auto
insurance in most states. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:861(A)(1) (2002) (requiring an
auto liability policy or bond for all motor vehicles registered in Louisiana). But in the absence
of proof of insurance, the applicant must give other evidence of financial responsibility, such
as posting a bond, to indicate that funds will be available to compensate accident victims for
any accidents involving the vehicle. Id.; cf. Anna Petrova, Russian Federation: Compulsory
Motor Third Party Liability Insurance: Russian Update, MONDAQ.COM, Jan. 29, 2009,
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=73230 (noting that effective January 1, 2009,
“Russia finally became a participant of the international motor civil liability insurance
system” involving forty-five European and Middle Eastern countries). 
19. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 39-40; DORFMAN, supra note 14, at 462-64; LEX K.
LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT
23-26 (3d ed. 2000); JOSEPH W. LITTLE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON WORKERS’
COMPENSATION 69-71 (5th ed. 2004) (describing workers’ compensation system as “social
insurance”); REJDA, supra note 14, at 556 (noting that since 1920, most states have had
workers’ compensation statutes and “[a]ll states today have workers compensation laws”);
TRIESCHMANN ET AL., supra note 14, at 217-27 (describing how workers’ compensation systems
operate and noting that, although employers in most states have freedom to self-insure, most
purchase insurance from state or private insurers); VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at
216-17. The important socioeconomic role of workers’ compensation coverage is reflected in
state efforts to enforce and police the workers’ compensation system. See, e.g., Audit Hits
Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Claims Handling, INS. J., Feb. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/Midwest/2009/02/27/98239.htm (describing audit of
state workers compensation system that found mistakes resulting in $3 million in under-
paid claims and possible improper denial of claims; although underpayments “represent[ed]
less than 1 percent of overall benefits paid,” auditors recommended improved oversight
because of the system’s importance); Calif. Sues Firm over Alleged Workers’ Comp Scam,
ADVISEN FPN, Feb. 27, 2009, http://fpn.advisen.com/articles/article89027502-1084249472.html
(“California has sued a company that promises businesses can avoid paying state-mandated
workers’ compensation insurance by designating security guards, cooks and other employees
as corporate officers. The suit ... claims unfair competition and deceptive business practices
... [and] seeks a permanent injunction ... and at least $300,000 in fines.”).
20. Historically, suretyship has been distinguished from insurance. See, e.g., Pearlman
order to license a car.18 And the State effectively mandates workers’
compensation coverage.19
As a result of these characteristics, insurance policies and the
insurance systems of industrialized nations tend to serve socioeco-
nomic purposes as social instruments and to take on the role of
social institutions. Consider typical commercial activity. A building
usually will not be built unless the developer can obtain surety
bonds20 and the various contractors are able to obtain general
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v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 140 n.19 (1962) (“[T]he usual view, grounded in commercial
practice, [is] that suretyship is not insurance.”); United States v. Markowitz Bros., Inc., 383
F.2d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1967) (“There are marked and traditional differences between a surety
contract and a contract of insurance.”). Beginning in the 1970s, however, an increasing
number of courts have recognized that insurers and sureties play largely the same
socioeconomic role and hold sureties to the same standard of good faith and fair dealing as
insurers—including potential liability for bad faith. See, e.g., Dodge v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of
Md., 778 P.2d 1240 (Ariz. 1989); Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J,
940 P.2d 348, 351-52 (Colo. 1997); see also 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note
4, § 22.13; Troy L. Harris, Good Faith, Suretyship, and the Ius Commune, 53 MERCER L. REV.
581 (2002); Aron J. Frakes, Note, Surety Bad Faith: Tort Recovery for Breach of a Construction
Performance Bond, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 497; cf. Sur. Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10
P.3d 338, 342 (Utah 2000) (holding that a contract under which surety agreed to issue $50,000
bond if obligor gave surety consideration was an “insurance contract” under Utah law and
required a license for engaging in such business; absent the license, the contract was
unenforceable).
21. To illustrate, as this Article was being written, my daily email from the Risk and
Insurance Management Society contained an email from a risk manager seeking input from
other subscribers to the listserv regarding the proper package of insurance coverages to
protect against liability risks. See Posting of Jaquelyn Mittelhammer, Jacquelyn.Mittel
hammer@americas.bnparibas.com, to noreply@lyris.rims.org (Jan. 16, 2008) (on file with
author). Such types of requests or colloquy are a frequent occurrence on this listserv in which
risk managers, brokers, and others with insurance interests trade information regarding
insurance products, risk exposure, and related matters. Postings and exchanges of this sort
reflect the degree to which insurance has come to be considered standard and even essential
for much commercial activity.
22. This combination of insurance policies is common for most businesses. See DORFMAN,
supra note 14, at 350-51, 351 fig.18-1; REJDA, supra note 14, at 304-17; TRIESCHMANN ET AL.,
supra note 14, 204-08, 217-20; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 580-81. 
23. For construction projects, there usually will also be architects’ professional liability
insurance. Professional liability insurance, often denominated errors and omissions coverage
or even called malpractice insurance, is common among many professions, including
liability coverage, professional liability coverage, builder’s risk
insurance, and basic property insurance after completion of the
building.21 For both new and existing commercial activity, the
typical business requires auto insurance, premises and operations
general liability insurance, products and completed operations
general liability insurance, and workers’ compensation coverage
mandated by state law.22 Manufacturers, in addition, will need to be
sure that their liability policies have sufficient coverage for products
and completed operations exposures. Similarly, professionals such
as lawyers, doctors, accountants, insurance agents, and insurance
brokers will need errors and omissions or professional liability
insurance.23
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architects, doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers, investment advisers, insurance brokers,
and insurance agents. See Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 157 N.W.2d 870, 872
(Neb. 1998) (describing insurable professional services as anything “arising out of a vocation,
calling, occupation, or employment involving specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and the
labor or skill involved is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical or
manual” (citation omitted)); cf. 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 6.02
(noting distinctions between brokers and agents, primarily that brokers represent
policyholders in procuring insurance whereas agents represent insurers in selling and
servicing insurance). Commercial policyholders, and less obviously commercial entities such
as homeowners associations, may also purchase directors and officers liability insurance. See,
e.g., Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 887, 887 n.1 (1999) (noting a study that found that 92 percent of public corporations
purchase director and officer liability insurance).
24. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. But see Texas Pulls Uninsured
Motorists off the Road, BUS. INS., Jan. 19, 2009, available at http://www.businessinsurance.
com/article/20090118/Issue0504/301189965 (noting that, despite financial responsibility laws,
many drivers, perhaps 20 percent, operate vehicles illegally by driving without insurance,
creating significant premium increases for law-abiding drivers). 
25. See supra note 12.
26. See Joseph B. Treaster, Umbrella Coverage for Preventing Your Ruin, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2008, at H10.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19. 
28. See MARION R.FREMONT-SMITH,GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 437 (2004).
Although perhaps less obvious on the level of personal insurance,
the same holds true. As noted above, banks will not lend to home-
owners in the absence of homeowners coverage and states will not
let consumers or businesses license a car without at least minimal
amounts of automobile insurance.24 And the typical homeowners
insurance policy also provides personal liability coverage to the
homeowner.25 Individuals with reasonably high net worths also
frequently purchase “umbrella” insurance that provides additional
and supplementary liability insurance protection.26 Many states
require and statutorily administer workers’ compensation insur-
ance, making it a necessary condition for nearly any commercial
activity and even for government activity.27 In addition, many
businesses, as a practical matter, also may need to acquire directors
and officers insurance to induce people to accept these posts or to
satisfy other constituencies.28 Moreover, other businesses may need
or strongly desire to obtain employment practices liability insur-
ance, environmental impairment insurance, or other insurance
products designed for risks presented by their enterprises.
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29. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 15A § 18 (West 2002) (“Every full-time and part-
time student enrolled in a public or independent institution of higher learning located in the
commonwealth shall participate in a qualifying student health insurance program.”).
30. See, e.g., Ruben Torrez & David Gallegos, The Pre-Participation Physical Exam, RISK
& INJURY PREVENTION SERIES (N.M. Activities Ass’n Sports Med. Advisory Comm.), 2009,
at 2, http://www.nmact.org/files/Sports_Med_Article_2009.pdf (“While requirements vary
between school districts, most mandate that each participant have their own medical
insurance.”). 
31. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1522 (1987).
32. Id. at 1572 (“Virtually all insurers have excluded coverage for sexual abuse liability
from their [day-care industry] policies.”).
33. See id. at 1521, 1566-68 (reviewing various services, products, and industries affected
by the 1980s insurance crisis); George J. Church, Sorry, Your Policy Is Canceled, TIME, Mar.
24, 1986, at 16.
34. Adverse selection in voluntary insurance is “the disproportionate tendency of those
who are more likely to suffer losses to seek insurance against those losses.” Kenneth S.
Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward
a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 102 n.82 (1993);
see also DORFMAN, supra note 14, at 95 (describing the difficulty underwriters have in
determining the risk of insuring persons in poor health); VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note
14, at 21-22 (noting how adverse selection accumulates bad risks, which disrupts
underwriters’ predictions about future losses); Abraham & Liebman, supra, at 102 n.82
(“Disability insurance is especially susceptible to adverse selection.”).
35. Moral hazard is the tendency to take fewer precautions to insurance. See infra note
350. One commentator defines related “morale hazard” as when “[a] person who deliberately
Job applicants always desire health insurance and some organ-
izations may mandate health coverage, such as colleges that insist
that students either prove health coverage or sign up with the
college’s group plan.29 Proof of health or accident insurance is
commonly required as a condition of children participating in sports
leagues or other school or community activities.30 During the mid-
1980s, a crisis of sorts resulted when liability insurers were loathe
to cover community swimming pools unless diving boards were
removed,31 or to cover day-care centers in the wake of child abuse
allegations.32 When insurance became unavailable or unaffordable,
a number of these important institutions shut down or otherwise
curtailed activity, at least temporarily.33
Life insurance is seldom required—which is why life insurance
salespersons can be some of the peskiest salespersons on the
planet—and disability insurance is both underappreciated by the
public and regarded as difficult to underwrite by insurers because
of perceived problems of adverse selection34 and moral hazard.35 But
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causes a loss ... [or] exaggerates the size of a claim to defraud an insurer.” DORFMAN, supra
note 14, at 480. 
36. See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 176-98 (describing the role of life and
health insurance policies in protecting dependents in the event of death, serious bodily injury,
or other loss that reduces or terminates income).
37. For example, for a century, life insurance has been considered as much an investment
as a type of insurance. In Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911), Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, permitted the assignment of the insurance
policy as part of the purchase of surgical services despite the general rule, which still remains
in effect, that insurance policies may not be assigned unless the contingent event insured
against already had taken place. By contrast, no court would ever permit a policyholder to
assign a liability policy without insurer approval and permit the assignee to obtain coverage
for a liability-creating loss event that took place due to the assignee’s conduct after the
assignment. See 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 3.13 (discussing law
of insurance policy assignment); see also Jeffrey Lipton, Barbados: Asset Protection Insurance
as an Alternative to Trusts and Foundations, MONDAQ.COM, Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.
mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=57710 (noting that it may be fraudulent to seek asset
protection after a liability creating event).
38. See Survey: Insurance Ranks No. 2 as Most Important Bill To Pay On-Time, INS. J.,
Dec. 30, 2008, available at www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/12/30/96652.htm.
both are products that should be in wide social use to protect
personal and family assets and to act as a form of risk distribution
and forced saving that makes it less likely that dependents of a
decedent will become a drain on the state and its public coffers.36
More important, when consumers purchase life and disability
insurance, they do so with an understanding of the role these
products will play in their risk management and financial planning
efforts.37 In the absence of such coverage, injured persons or the
survivors of decedents will have heightened incentives to bring
third-party claims against persons or entities thought to play a role
in the injury or death, creating more liability lawsuits and more
strained theories of recovery in such suits.
Treating the insurance policy as a social instrument as well as a
contract, a product, or a type of private legislation accords well with
the simple reality that insurance is now part of the warp and woof
of the socioeconomic fabric. For example, a recent survey revealed
that consumers consider insurance premiums to be the second most
important household bill, one that they pay on time, taking care to
avoid the potentially disastrous consequences of late payment or
nonpayment.38 Only the household’s monthly mortgage payment
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39. Id.
40. ERICSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 3. Ericson and his coauthors go so far as to contend
that insurance is something of a private, albeit heavily regulated, governor of social and
economic conduct.
In its ideal form, insurance governs through nine interconnected dimensions.
First, it attempts to produce knowledge of risk by objectifying everything into
degrees of chance of harm. Second, it makes everything it objectifies calculable
and thereby subject to commodification. It uses actuarial techniques to convert
the concrete facts of objective risks it produces into probability classifications.
Each classification is then assigned its respective cost so that prices can be set
and compensation for the effects of chance can be paid. Third, actuarialism
creates a risk pool, a population that has a stake in the identified risks and the
specific harms they entail. This stake transforms the population into a collective
with an interest in minimizing loss and compensating those who have suffered
loss. Fourth, insurance protects against loss of capital. What is actually insured
is not the particular event that causes harm to a member of the risk pool, but
the capital against which the insurer offers indemnification. Fifth, insurance is
managerial. It manages risks on the basis of surveillance and audit for a
population dispersed in space and time but nevertheless bound together by the
collective interests noted above. Sixth, the population is also bound legally.
Insurance objectifies risk by making it subject to contract and adjudication. At
the same time, it helps the law to assign liability to the party most able to
distribute the loss through insurance. Seventh, in providing a futures market in
security, insurance offers a cultural framework for conceptions of time, destiny,
providence, responsibility, economic utility, and justice. Eighth, insurance is a
social technology of justice. It bridges individual and social responsibility
through distributive justice (collective sharing of loss) and restorative justice
(financial indemnification). Ninth, insurance is therefore political, combining
aspects of collective well-being and individual liberty in a state of perpetual
tension.
Id. at 5-6. Obviously, this Article and any initial attempt to apply the insurance policy as
social instrument perspective to coverage disputes cannot deal with the full ramifications of
the Insurance as Governance thesis, some of which would undoubtedly be disputed by some
judges, scholars, and policymakers. But it seems that the core of its thesis—that insurance
plays a central institutional role in societies and economies—is beyond question. That makes
the insurance policy something more than a mere contract. Notably, this thesis is relatively
new. To date, only a handful of law review articles even mention the subject. On September
5, 2009, a search in Westlaw through all law reviews and journals for “insurance as
governance” produced only thirty results.
41. Allan Chen, Climate Change and the Insurance Industry, ENVTL. ENERGY TECH.
DIVISION NEWS (Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., Berkeley, Cal.), Fall 2005, at 3, http://eetd.
lbl.gov/newsletter/nl22/eetd-n122-2-climate.htm.
ranked higher.39 “Insurance is embedded in all aspects of daily
life.”40 If the insurance industry were a nation, it would have the
world’s third largest gross national product.41
In addition, the requirements imposed by insurers upon pol-
icyholders and those doing business with policyholders often have
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42. See generally Underwriters Laboratories, About UL, http://www.ul.com/global/eng/
pages/corporate/aboutul/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
43. See Harold Furchtgott-Roth et al., The Law and Economics of Regulating Rating
Firms, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 49, 87-88 (2007).
44. Id. at 88.
45. See Wendy K. Mariner, Medicine and Public Health: Crossing Legal Boundaries, 10
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 121, 146 n.113 (2007) (listing examples of contingent health care
benefit policies). In a similar but more upscale vein, “Venture Insurance Programs’ Preferred
Club Program teamed with CR Certification Corporation ... a provider of independent auditing
and certification of cardiac emergency readiness programs to ensure a best practice cardiac
emergency readiness plan is in place at the golf and country clubs it insures.” Andrea Ortega-
Wells, Preferred Club Program Adds Cardiac Emergency Readiness Program, INS. J., Feb. 27,
2009, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2009/02/27/95438.htm.
46. See Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 557-61 (1948).
47. See Hazel Glenn Beh, Physical Losses in Cyberspace, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 55, 80 n.130
(2001) (noting that auto insurers were the leading proponents of mandatory air bags in
automobiles as means of lowering costs of auto accidents (citing Robert Kneuper & Bruce
Yandle, Auto Insurers and the Air Bag, 61 J. RISK & INS. 107 (1994))); John G. Van
Laningham, Comment, The Making of the 1986 Florida Safety Belt Law: Issues and Insight,
14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 685, 696 (1986) (noting that auto insurers supported legislation
encouraging seat belt use); see also Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation
of Risk: Insurance Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1613-14 (2008) (expressing guarded
optimism that property insurers vulnerable to weather-related risk will support initiative to
reduce and mitigate impact of climate change). See generally JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L.
HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990) (describing evolution of seat belts, air bags,
a powerful impact on shaping society. A classic example is
Underwriters Laboratories’ (UL) role in testing electrical appliances
in order to gauge their safety.42 Today, one almost never reads about
a tragic fire started by a short in a coffee maker, toaster, or lamp,
but at one time these were major hazards. Because of the efforts of
the insurance industry to define the risks associated with emerging
electrical technologies, manufacturers were forced to improve the
safety of their products to satisfy UL certification standards.43
Safety certification is now sought out by consumers and mandated
by thousands of state and local governments.44
Health insurers often insist upon or offer financial incentives for
employee wellness programs designed to reduce the incidence and
severity of the group’s medical problems.45 Liability insurers also
may insist policyholders take certain safety precautions.46 We
have air bags, antilock brakes, and seat belts in automobiles,
and sometimes laws mandating their use, in large part because
of the efforts of auto insurers.47 Insurers are often “agents of
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and antilock brakes).
48. ERICSON ET AL., supra note 11, passim.
49. See generally id. at 268-76 (detailing the many ways that the insurance industry
contributed to automobile accident prevention).
50. See, e.g., Schwarz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 150 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Unlike
most other contracts for goods or services, an insurance policy is characterized by elements
of ... public interest.” (citing Cates Constr., Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 980 P.2d 407 (1999)));
Aecon Bldgs., Inc. v. Zurich N. Am., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1238 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (“[T]he
business of insurance is one affected by the public interest.” (quotation and citation omitted));
Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, 246 S.W.3d 653, 674 (Tex. 2008) (“One public-
policy concern is whether it is or is not in the public interest for a risk to be shifted.”); see also
HENDERSON & JERRY, supra note 4, § 1.03, at 20 (discussing “insurance and the social order”).
51. See Mississippi Police Station Closed Due to Lapsed Workers’ Compensation Policy,
INS. J., Dec. 31, 2008, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2008/
12/31/96660.htm (“The Port Gibson, Mississippi Police Department was open Monday, three
days after a payment lapse on an insurance policy forced its closure ... because the city clerk’s
office neglected to pay the bill, which is $6,898 every three months.”).
52. Bruce Landis, State Must Buy Liability Insurance To Extend Commuter Rail Service
to Warwick and South County, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.
projo.com/business/content/bz_rail_insurance_02-25-09_1BDEIO3_v13.3244af5.html.
According to the state’s Department of Transportation Director: “Our alternative is not to
provide service.” Id.
prevention,”48 encouraging greater safety and loss-minimization
conduct by policyholders.49 Not surprisingly, many court decisions
describe insurance as affected with a public interest,50 an undeni-
able truism in light of the substantial government regulation of
insurance.
Recent episodes reflect the degree to which insurance has become
central to the smooth daily functioning of society. For example,
when a Mississippi police department’s workers’ compensation
coverage lapsed in 2008, government authorities closed the police
station for four days and did not reopen the station until the insurer
reinstated the department’s coverage.51 Although this may not have
been the most citizen-friendly solution to the problem—essentially
leaving a community vulnerable to crime rather than taking the
risk that an officer might be hurt in the line of duty—it nicely
illustrates the degree to which insurance has become central to
society and even regarded as mandatory in many cases. In similar
fashion, Amtrak recently insisted that Rhode Island “buy $200
million in liability insurance if it wants to extend commuter rail
service to Warwick and South County,” a requirement estimated to
require premium payments of $1.5 million per year.52 A community
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53. See Daniel Axelrod, CMC Faces ‘Disastrous’ Effect from $20.5M Judgment, SCRANTON
TIMES-TRIBUNE, Jan. 16, 2009, available at http://fpn.advisen.com/articles/article875780613
5765606.html.
54. See Andy Simpson, ACE Adds Green Building Endorsements to Builders Risk Product,
INS. J., Feb. 20, 2009, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2009/02/
20/94835.htm; Patricia Tom, WKF&C Offers Employment Practices Liability Insurance, INS.
J., Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/11/04/
95235.htm; Zurich Creates Policies for Carbon Capture and Sequestration Needs, INS. J., Jan.
20, 2009, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2009/01/20/97104. htm;
Chris Boggs, Insurance Program for Not-for-Profit Senior Living, MYNEWMARKETS.COM, Jan.
27, 2009, http://www.mynewmarkets.com/article_view.php?id=97243.
55. See Patricia Tom, Fireman’s Fund Offers Farm and Ranch Equipment Breakdown
Coverage, INS. J., Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/
2008/11/03/95200.htm.
56. See Andrea Ortega-Wells, Affinity Enhances Coverages for Private Event Program, INS.
J., Jan. 23, 2009, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/10/17/
94749.htm.
57. See Chris Boggs, Groceries Protection Insurance—Something New in England,
MYNEWMARKETS.COM, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.mynewmarkets.com/article_view.php?id
=97017.
58. A “soft” market is one in which insurance coverage is readily available for most risks
and insurers generally engage in fairly aggressive price competition for business. Soft markets
generally are characterized by strong capital positions for insurers, confidence that risks are
predictably under control, and good returns on insurer investments. Given these factors,
insurers become hungry for premium dollars to invest. For example, interest rates during the
late 1970s and early 1980s were very high, prompting insurers to seek aggressively to sell
policies and bring in premium dollars for investment. Dramatic rate dips in the mid-1980s,
combined with some real (for example, asbestos claims) and perceived (for example, prominent
stories regarding allegations of child abuse in day-care centers or large awards against
operators of recreational equipment) increases in risk, created a “hard” market. A hard
market is, perhaps unsurprisingly, the opposite of a soft market and is characterized by
reduced availability of coverage, higher premiums, and mediocre or bleak prospects for
investment. See DORFMAN, supra note 14, at 332; REJDA, supra note 14, at 67-68; VAUGHAN
& VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 88; Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in
medical center in Scranton had more than $1 million in basic
liability coverage but faces a potential fiscal disaster now that it has
been hit with a $20.5 million medical malpractice judgment.53
The number of specialized niche insurance policies regularly
offered by insurers to meet particular policyholder needs under-
scores the role insurance policies play as building blocks in the
social and commercial system.54 The market now provides insur-
ance coverage for farm and ranch equipment breakdown,55 liability
risks posed by hosting or sponsoring private events,56 and even
“groceries protection insurance.”57 There is all manner of coverage
available when the market is “soft”58: collateral damage property
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Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1809
(2007).
59. See Chris Boggs, Crump Develops New Collateral Damages Property Coverage, INS. J.,
Jan. 26, 2009, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/12/16/96351.
htm.
60. See Interpreters and Translators, http://www.mynewmarkets.com/main.php?p=4785
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
61. See Andy Simpson, Media Bloggers Group Launches Liability Insurance Program, INS.
J., Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2008/10/10/
94525.htm.
62. See Chris Boggs, Hard-To-Place Risks of All Types, MYNEWMARKETS.COM, Feb. 11,
2009, http://www.mynewmarkets.com/article_view.php?id=97790 (“Appalachian Underwriters
Inc. ... [has] formed a brokerage division to place unique, unusual and/or large accounts.
Target classes include: property risks with coastal and earthquake exposures; casualty risks
such as swimming pool contractors, street & road contractors, crane erectors, truck body
manufactures, iron & steel manufactures, ammunition manufactures; environmental risks
such as hazmat contractors, mold remediation contractors up to landfills and oil and gas
contractors; and risks with professional liability exposures.”).
63. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 14-15, 19, 171-73, 220-25; TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE MYTH 10-21 (2005); Baker, supra note 11, at 4; Adam F. Scales, The Chicken
and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham’s “The Liability Century,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1259-60,
1279 (2008) (book review). 
64. ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 4-5.
65. Id. at 39-40.
66. Baker, supra note 11, at 4-5.
insurance,59 interpreter-translator insurance,60 and bloggers defa-
mation insurance.61 Some brokerage operations are devoted to
obtaining insurance to deal with especially difficult risks.62
Indeed, it can be said without exaggeration that liability insur-
ance has played a major, perhaps dominant, role in the development
of modern tort law, a fact thought underappreciated by most
observers.63 The increasing availability of liability insurance, which
was generally nonexistent prior to the latter half of the nineteenth
century, radically shifted the economic incentive to pursue tort
claims.64 Prior to insurance, almost all individuals and most small
businesses lacked funds sufficient to compensate injured parties.65
Even if the case for relief was strong under the dominant tort
liability regime, most potential tort claims remained dormant for
the simple reason that the claims were not sufficiently worth
pursuing for want of a sufficiently deep pocket defendant.66
The advent of liability insurance changed this dynamic by mak-
ing tort litigation economically attractive to injured persons and
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67. Most consumers would find even modest attorney hourly fees prohibitively expensive.
68. See Baker, supra note 11, at 4-7, 13-14.
69. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 35-38, 63, 167-70, 223-38; Douglas R. Richmond,
Liability Insurers’ Right To Defend Their Insureds, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 115-18 (2001);
Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1592-98 (1994); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113,
1163-72 (1990); Scales, supra note 63, at 1262.
70. Regarding the duty to defend generally, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, § 3; 1
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 5.02; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note
4, § 9.03. See generally James M. Fischer, Insurer-Policyholder Interests, Defense Counsel’s
Professional Duties, and the Allocation of Power To Control the Defense, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 21
(2007).
71. Another relatively common problem occurs when plaintiff ’s counsel demands the full
liability insurance policy limit in settlement. The insurer may doubt the strength of the claim
and certainly would prefer to pay less than the policy limit. But acceptance of the demand
may be highly advantageous to the policyholder who, in the absence of settlement, might face
a verdict and judgment exceeding the policy limit. In such situations, under either the single
or dual client model, the defense attorney should provide a fair analysis of the claim’s likely
success and value, and take all apt action to protect the client. Defense counsel’s failure to
take such action in one notorious case resulted in a $145 million punitive damages verdict
against the insurer, which stipulated that counsel was its agent in this regard, an award
ultimately reduced to $9 million after review by the Utah and United States Supreme Courts.
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (striking down $145
million punitive award affirmed by Utah Supreme Court as excessive on constitutional
grounds); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM
1-3, 429-30 (2008) [hereinafter STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD]. 
72. There exists considerable division among courts and commentators and within the
legal profession regarding whether an attorney provided by a liability insurer to defend a
claim against a policyholder represents only the policyholder-defendant or whether the
insurer is a “client” as well. A slight majority of the states have adopted the “two-client” view,
plaintiffs’ lawyers, who in most situations could afford to take a case
only if it promised a reasonably good chance of recovery and a
resulting contingent fee.67 In addition, the availability of insurance
and the contours of coverage provided continue to shape tort law,
particularly the selection of cases brought and settlement out-
comes.68 Perhaps most important, insurers’ duty to defend, part of
the standard general liability policy, systematically involves in-
surers and insurer-selected counsel in nearly all tort claims
litigation.69 As part of this arrangement, in which insurers agree to
defend potentially covered claims even if the allegations are far-
fetched on their face, insurers also have the right to control the
defense70 and settlement of the claims,71 as long as they do not
unduly interfere with the attorney-client relationship between
insurer-appointed defense counsel and the policyholder-defendant.72
2010] INSURANCE POLICY AS SOCIAL INSTRUMENT 1509
but all states require that, when there is a conflict of interest between policyholder and
insurer regarding defense of the claim or resolution of coverage matters, the attorney’s greater
loyalty is to the policyholder defendant. In many cases, policyholders are permitted to select
their own counsel in response to such conflicts. See, e.g., Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law
Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 601-02 (Ariz. 2001) (adopting two-client model with policyholder-
defendant as primary client and insurer as secondary client; permitting insurer to sue defense
counsel for alleged malpractice in overlooking other potentially applicable coverage); Nev.
Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 152 P.3d 737, 741-42
(Nev. 2007) (adopting two-client model as clear majority, but stressing that, when conflict
arises, counsel’s first duty is to protect policyholder-defendant and implicitly rejecting State
Bar of Nevada Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee Opinions 9, 26, and 28,
which adopted the one-client model); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d
625, 626-29 (Tex. 1998) (appearing to adopt one-client model, precluding insurer from suing
defense counsel for malpractice). See generally Silver, supra note 69, at 1592-98; Charles
Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45
DUKE L.J. 255 (1995).
Of course, even if the insurer is not a “client,” it has substantial contract rights in retaining
counsel for the policyholder. The attorney is required to perform competently the
contractually mandated tasks of defending the policyholder, reporting to the insurer, and
implementing settlement directives even if a “malpractice” action is not available. In practice
this can get messy because the insurer’s interest in cost control may clash with counsel’s duty
to provide adequate representation. For example, insurers have attempted, with mixed
success, to impose litigation guidelines upon counsel, the most extreme of which usually have
been considered to intrude overly upon the attorney’s professional judgment and the lawyer-
client relationship with the policyholder. See In re Rules of Prof ’l Conduct & Insurer Imposed
Billing Rules & Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 810, 813-17 (Mont. 2000) (striking down guidelines
that, among other things, required defense counsel to obtain permission of claims adjuster to
do legal research or take depositions). 
73. Inherent in all contracts is a duty of good faith and fair dealing, but insurance is
different than most contracts in that the duty has real teeth. Bad faith breach by an insurer
is a tort in most states and may result in imposition of a broad range of damages upon an
offending insurer, including punitive damages if the bad faith was committed with willful
indifference to the rights of the policyholder. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, § 11;
STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES §§ 1:02-1:03 (2d ed. 1997);
2 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, §§ 12.01-12.06; WILLIAM SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE
BAD FAITH LITIGATION (2009); STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, Supp.,
§§ 10.01-10.11; see also STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD, supra note 71, 435-43, 456-58 (observing
that, although rare, bad faith awards can reach seven figures and even reach the U.S.
Supreme Court).
An entire body of law unique to this aspect of insurance, the tort of
bad faith refusal to settle, has arisen as a result of the centrality of
insurance to the institution of litigation and compensation.73
Regardless of whether one approves or disapproves of this regime,
there is no disputing that, to a large extent, insurers have the final
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74. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
75. See DORFMAN, supra note 14, at 173 (“If an insurer denies a claim based on an
exclusion and the insured then contests the denial, the insurer has the legal burden of proving
it applied the exclusion correctly.”); 1 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 1.03[b]; 1
word on the value of claims, whether trials and appeals will occur,
and the speed with which tort disputes progress.74
Viewing the insurance policy as social instrument or institution—
part of a larger system of managing risk, facilitating commerce,
encouraging socially desirable activity, and protecting the public—
we can derive useful insights as to the proper construction of
disputed insurance policies. Appreciating this perspective also tends
to confirm better reasoned decisions and serves as a useful quality
control device to gauge whether contract-based analysis of a
coverage dispute resulted in the correct coverage decision. However,
characterizing the insurance policy as social instrument does not
auger for finding coverage in all instances. For example, when an
insurer denies coverage based not only upon contract-based argu-
ments but also a better appreciation of the social instrument aspects
of a disputed policy, a finding of no coverage may better serve the
social policies at issue. As the types of coverage disputes outlined in
the following section reveal, appreciating the status of insurance as
social instrument can help to illuminate and clarify coverage
disputes, logically leading to sounder, more consistent judicial de-
cisions. In many, perhaps most, cases, adding the social instrument
perspective to traditional contract analysis will bolster a contract-
driven assessment. In other circumstances, it may reveal problem-
atic aspects of a contract-based approach, particularly excessive
textualism, offering a useful check or measure of quality control for
insurance coverage adjudication.
In addition, appreciating the status of insurance policies as part
of social policy provides an additional supporting basis for proper
application of important ground rules of contract-based insurance
policy construction. For example, one of the key axioms of contract-
based insurance law is that the policyholder bears the burden to
show the presence of an insured event, whereas the insurer bears
the burden to demonstrate the applicability of any exclusion upon
which the insurer relies.75 If the insurer successfully discharges his
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STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 2.06[C]; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing
the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12
CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 358-60 (2006) [hereinafter Stempel, Coverage Carnage]; see also 1
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 1.01 at 5 (“[A]ny limitation in coverage must be
described in clear and explicit language.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
Exclusions may also fall, in whole or in part, on public policy grounds. See, e.g., Collins v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Or., 822 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Or. 1991) (holding an exclusion in an auto policy
ineffective to divest the policyholder of minimum coverage required by state law); id. at 1162
(Unis, J., dissenting) (arguing that exclusion should be invalidated entirely and recovery
permitted up to policy limits).
76. See 1 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, §§ 1.01, 1.03[b]; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS, supra note 4, Supp., § 2.06[C]; see, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl,
Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Wis. 2004) (“Exclusions sometimes have exceptions; if a particular
exclusion applies, we then look to see whether any exception to that exclusion reinstates
coverage. An exception pertains only to the exclusion clause within which it appears; the
applicability of an exception will not create coverage if the insuring agreement precludes it
or if a separate exclusion applies.”). Requiring policyholders to prove the applicability of
exceptions is a logical corollary to having the policyholder shoulder the initial burden of
proving a claim within the insuring agreement. The policyholder thus is consistently required
to demonstrate entitlement to coverage whereas the insurer consistently must negate a
policyholder’s proven entitlement to coverage.
77. The policyholder also must establish other basics such as the existence of the policy
and the policyholder’s payment of the required premiums. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note
4, §§ 80-82, 87; 1 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 1.01; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS, supra note 4, Supp., §§ 2.06, 4.01, 4.04; see, e.g., Am. Girl, 673 N.W.2d at 73
(noting that the first step in policy construction is to determine whether a policyholder’s claim
falls within basic scope of policy and grant of coverage). 
78. See supra note 75. 
burden and the policyholder then argues that an exception to the
exclusion restores coverage, the policyholder bears the burden of
persuasion on that point.76
Seeing insurance policies as social instruments that are part of
the social policy infrastructure buttresses this approach in that the
social instrument view logically requires that a policyholder cannot
obtain the advantages of insurance without first establishing that
a covered event has taken place, along with other basics such as
the existence of the policy, the policyholder’s payment of required
premiums, and so forth.77 However, once this has taken place,
an insurer who wishes to defeat coverage and implicitly defeat
insurance’s social policy goals must establish that an exclusion
removes coverage.78 Such a showing means that coverage is not
required and thus the insurance policy’s social purpose is fulfilled.
In addition, the exclusion must be one that is not inconsistent
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79. See, e.g., Collins, 822 P.2d at 1147-48, 1151; id. at 1162 (Unis, J., dissenting)
(advocating for invalidating the exclusion entirely and permitting recovery up to policy limits);
see also Cal. State Auto. Ass’n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 108, 110-11 (1951) (holding that
states have legal authority to regulate insurance business, including content of policy forms
and amount of coverage provided); FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 4, § 3.01; JERRY
& RICHMOND, supra note 4, § 25, at 141-44; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note
4, §§ 2.03, 2.04, 2.05[H], 4.10; Randall, supra note 4, at 107.
80. See FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 4, § 2.13; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 4.10; see, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Kinman, 483 S.W.2d 166, 167,
171 (Ark. 1972) (affirming decision that amputation of plaintiff’s leg after the 180 day
limitation did not preclude recovery); Strickland v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 242 S.E.2d 148, 148-50
(Ga. 1978) (holding it unconscionable to enforce provision that leg must be severed within
ninety days of accident to obtain benefits for loss of limb; time limit in policy attempts to
distort incentives regarding policyholder’s willingness to follow medical advice); Karl v. N.Y.
Life Ins. Co., 381 A.2d 62, 63-64 (N.J. 1977) (finding same result regarding policy that would
not consider death to result from assault if victim, who never recovered consciousness, lived
beyond one year from date of assault); see also L’Orange v. Med. Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57,
59, 63 (6th Cir. 1968) (holding that insurer’s cancellation of doctor’s medical malpractice
policy was ineffective because the reason for cancellation violated public policy). But see Kirk
v. Fin. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 389 N.E.2d 144, 144-45, 149 (Ill. 1978) (enforcing time limit
requirement for coverage). 
81. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, § 2.05; FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note
4, § 2.09; JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 4, § 25D; 1 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, §
1.03[b][2]; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 4.09; see, e.g., Lachs v. Fid.
& Cas. Co. of N.Y., 118 N.E.2d 555, 556-60 (N.Y. 1954) (holding that airline trip insurance
applied when sold at gate from which decedent boarded chartered flight even though language
in policy was intended only to cover scheduled commercial flights).
82. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, § 2.05; FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note
4, § 2.09; JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 4, § 25D; 1 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, §
1.03[b][2]; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 4.09; see, e.g., Atwater
Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985).
83. For this reason, Addison Insurance Co. v. Fay, 905 N.E.2d 747, 749, 752-53 (Ill. 2009),
is not, as some commentators have suggested, an erroneous opinion. See infra Part II.A.
84. See ANDERSON ET. AL., supra note 4, § 2.01; 1 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, §§
with applicable insurance regulation,79 does not violate public
policy,80 and does not defeat the objectively reasonable expectations
of the policyholder regarding coverage.81 Hidden, deceptive, mis-
leading, or unclear exclusions are ineffective to defeat coverage.82
These norms of insurance policy interpretation not only flow from
sound contract theory but also from an appreciation of the social
and economic function played by insurance policies. As a logical
result, a covered claim should not be denied by an exclusion unless
the foregoing conditions are satisfied.83
The contract rules that exclusions are strictly construed against
the insurer84 and that ambiguous language is construed against the
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1.01, 1.03; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 2.06[C]; Stempel, Coverage
Carnage, supra note 75, at 358-60; see, e.g., Belt Painting Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 795 N.E.2d
15, 17 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that an absolute pollution exclusion in liability policy did not bar
coverage for claim against landlord policyholder relating to lead paint in apartment; exclusion
must be strictly construed against insurer).
85. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, § 2.04; JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 4, § 25A;
1 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 1.03[b][1]; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 4, § 4.08; Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95
MICH. L. REV. 531 (1996). 
86. See 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 4.08.
87. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 4, § 25D[b] (dividing jurisdictions into strong,
weak, and moderate jurisdictions).
88. See id. § 65[a].
drafter/insurer (contra proferentem)85 also serve the social instru-
ment function by reducing the likelihood that erroneous construc-
tion of the policy will undermine social goals. However, courts differ
in their acceptance of the ambiguity principle.86 Some courts
struggle against making contra proferentem a basis for decision,
except as a last resort. Others are relatively quick to seize on
ambiguity and declare a victory for the nondrafter, usually the
policyholder.87 When the insurance-policy-as-social-instrument
factor is added to the analysis, it serves as a check against excessive
resistance to ambiguity analysis or excessive acceptance of the
concept. If a coverage resolution reached by ambiguity analysis
conflicts with the social instrument function of the insurance
product in question, a court would do well to reassess its application
of contra proferentem.
II. APPLYING THE SOCIAL INSTRUMENT PERSPECTIVE: THE     
PERPETUALLY PERPLEXING PROBLEM OF DETERMINING THE   
NUMBER OF “OCCURRENCES” UNDER A LIABILITY POLICY 
A recurring source of coverage litigation involving liability
insurance requires determining the number of “occurrences” under
an occurrence-based liability policy. The issue is important because
the typical policy provides a per-occurrence limit as well as a higher
overall “aggregate” limit.88 Consequently, in most situations a
determination of more occurrences makes more insurance money
available under a policy. But most policies also require that the
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89. See, e.g., Michael F. Aylward, Twin Towers: The 3.6 Billion Question Arising from the
World Trade Center Attacks, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 169, 172 (2002); James M. Fisher, The
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is Indispensable, If We Only Knew What For?, 5 CONN.
INS. L.J. 151, 157-58 (1998); Thomas M. Jones & Jon D. Hirwitz, An Introduction to Insurance
Allocation Issues in Multiple-Trigger Cases, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 27 (1999).
90. See HENDERSON & JERRY, supra note 4, § 5.02[2]; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 2.06[H][2]; John Mumford & Kathryn E. Kransdorf, Insurance
101—Insights for Young Lawyers: Still No Certainty-Determining the Number of Occurrences
in the Context of Multiple Injuries Caused by a Single Perpetrator, COVERAGE, Nov.-Dec. 2008,
at 3, available at http://www.hdjn.com/insurance/pdf/20090622110231674.pdf.
91. See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 60-61 (3d Cir.
1982) (finding single occurrence in class action sex discrimination suit even though the
conduct had “multiple and disparate impacts on individuals” and the injuries “extend[ed] over
a period of time”); Champion Int’l Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 546 F.2d 502, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1976)
(ruling that liability claims against maker of vinyl panels for sales to twenty-six recreational
vehicle makers were but one occurrence under vinyl company’s CGL policy); Trans. Ins. Co.
v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 487 F. Supp. 1325, 1329 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (finding that discrim-
ination claims by many employees were but one occurrence because claims attacked a single
company policy).
policyholder itself shoulder a deductible or self-insured retention. If
this amount is high enough in relation to the exposure created by a
claim or claims, the policyholder may well want a judicial determi-
nation of fewer occurrences, which will permit it to pay less in
deductibles or retentions and still receive enough in policy proceeds
to provide a significant net financial advantage to the policyholder.
Courts, of course, are aware of the malleability of the conse-
quences of occurrence-counting and know that their determinations
could either expand or contract coverage dramatically. Observers
generally posit a legal realist world in which court decisions seem
analytically inconsistent but generally united in that they tend to
maximize coverage for the policyholder when possible.89 On their
face, however, judicial approaches and results are highly varied,
even though almost all courts purport to determine the number of
occurrences by determining the number of “causes” of loss rather
than focusing on the “effect” or impact of the loss.90 For the most
part, courts correctly have tended to maximize the number of
occurrences in appropriate situations, but there are occasional
glaring examples to the contrary.91
This Part examines recent cases that illustrate the degree to
which courts can diverge on both the determination of the number
of occurrences and the rationale for determining the number of
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92. Randy J. Maniloff, Illinois High Court Issues a Jaw Dropper on Number of
Occurrences, BINDING AUTH. (White and Williams LLP, Phila., Pa.), Jan. 27, 2009, available
at http://www.whiteandwilliams.com/CM/Custom/Newsletters.asp (follow “January, 27, 2009
–Illinois High Court Issues a Jaw Dropper on Number of Occurrences; Yes We Can Find
Multiple Occurrences” hyperlink). 
93. 905 N.E.2d 747 (Ill. 2009).
94. Id. at 749.
95. Id. at 750.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 749-50. According to the court, 
The pit in which the boys were found was partially filled with water. The sand
and clay around the pit was saturated, creating what an engineer testified is
called a “quick condition.” A quick condition is one where a cushion of water
prevents the soil from supporting a load of weight and can result in that load
sinking and becoming trapped. 
Id. at 747 (footnote omitted).
occurrences. Utilizing the insurance-policy-as-social-instrument
concept, it becomes clear that one decision was erroneous whereas
three of the decisions were correct, even though one has been
strongly criticized by insurers and their counsel.
A. Addison Insurance Co. v. Fay 
In a decision noted commentator Randy Maniloff characterized
as a “jaw dropper,”92 the Illinois Supreme Court created a bit of a
stir in Addison Insurance Co. v. Fay, holding that the deaths of two
boys in a dangerous, quicksand-like industrial pit constituted two
occurrences under the property owner’s general liability policy.93
The tragedy at the root of the coverage dispute involved fourteen-
year-old Everett Hodgins and fifteen-year-old Justice Carr.94 On an
April evening in 1997, the boys, returning home due to a storm,
attempted a shortcut through property owned by Donald Parrish.95
Reaching the excavation pit, which was less than 150 yards from the
Carr home, Carr attempted to jump over the water accumulated in
the pit and became stuck in the “quick” sand and clay, unable to
extricate himself.96 Hodgins attempted to aid his friend but became
trapped in the pit as well.97 Eventually, they succumbed to hypo-
thermia and drowned before their bodies were located three days
later.98
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99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 753.
102. Id. at 750.
103. Id. at 757.
104. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, § 9.04; 1 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, §
9.02[b]; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 2.06[H]. But see ANDERSON ET
AL., supra note 4, §§ 9.03, 9.05 (collecting cases favoring finding of fewer occurrences unless
injuries claimed are substantially separated in time from precipitating cause); 1 OSTRAGER
& NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 9.02[a] (same). 
105. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928); 65 C.J.S. Negligence
§ 189 (2009).
The boys’ families and estates sued Parrish due to the dangerous
condition of the pit.99 Parrish’s liability insurer, Addison, agreed to
settle the two claims for Parrish’s policy limits, but the parties
disagreed whether those limits were $1 million, for a single “occur-
rence,” or $2 million, for two “occurrences.”100 The insurance policy
contained typical commercial general liability (CGL) language
that defined an occurrence as “an accident, including continuous
or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions” and, like almost all CGL policies, covered claims against
a policyholder for bodily injury to plaintiff(s) caused by an “occur-
rence.”101 The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the
appellate court reversed.102 The Supreme Court of Illinois reinstated
the trial court’s determination that the tragic deaths of the two
boys constituted two sufficiently distinct occurrences to merit the
application of two $1 million policy limits.103
If the Addison court merely had made a summary reversal of the
appellate court’s one-occurrence decision, it probably would not have
been noteworthy. As discussed below, there is ample precedent and
logic to suggest that there cannot be an occurrence within the
meaning of the CGL policy unless the plaintiff has suffered harm.104
A policyholder’s negligence or other wrongdoing standing alone,
commonly referred to as “negligence in the air,” is almost never
actionable.105 For example, if Parrish, without incident, kept his
excavation pit as a potential death trap, there would clearly be no
occurrence, no bodily injury to a third party, no lawsuit, and no
valid insurance claim. However, in the actual case, two human
beings tragically came in contact with the dangerous pit and
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106. See Addison, 905 N.E.2d at 749-50 (“The boys were found at the edge of the pool of
water, trapped in the wet clay and sand.... Although the two boys were facing different
directions, both bodies were close in proximity and indeed were physically touching.”).
107. Id. at 752-53.
108. Id. at 752 (citing cases).
109. Id. at 753 (“Addison seeks to limit recovery [for the claimants] by applying the stricter
policy limit. Therefore, we hold that Addison bears the burden of proving that the deaths of
Carr and Hodgins constitute one occurrence.”).
110. See 1 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, §§ 1.01, 1.03; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS, supra note 4, §§ 2.06, 4.08; Stempel, Coverage Carnage, supra note 75, at 358-60.
111. See Addison, 905 N.E.2d at 750 (“The investigators concluded that when the boys
reached the pit and the water, Carr attempted to jump across the water. In doing so, Carr
became trapped. The investigators also concluded that Hodgins then attempted to help his
friend out of the sand and clay, but became trapped himself. However, the investigators could
separately suffered and died, albeit in close proximity to one
another.106
Had Addison’s holding rested on this basis, expressly or implic-
itly, insurers might have harrumphed at the decision, yet Addison
hardly would have drawn great attention or ire. But the Addison
court’s approach and analysis rubbed insurers the wrong way.
Notwithstanding the hornbook rule that the policyholder must
establish coverage, the Addison court held that the insurer bore the
burden of persuasion on the issue of number of occurrences.107
Having found that the claims were clearly within the scope of
Parrish’s liability coverage, the court focused on another hornbook
rule of insurance: “Once the insured has demonstrated coverage, the
burden then shifts to the insurer to prove that a limitation or
exclusion applies.”108 Because defining the events at issue as one
occurrence rather than two operated to limit coverage, the court
characterized the insurer as attempting to establish an exclusion.109
And, as another hornbook rule of insurance posits, insurers bear the
burden to establish the applicability of an exclusion, and exclusions
are to be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the
policyholder.110
Because there were no living witnesses to the boys’ deaths, as-
signing to the insurer the burden of persuasion made the insurer
less likely to prevail. Nonetheless, a good deal of evidence suggested
that the boys entered the quicksand pit seriatim, and it was beyond
question that they died individual and separate deaths, no matter
how physically close their corpses may have been.111 The Addison
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not conclude how much time had elapsed between Carr’s and Hodgins’ entrapments, or
whether the two boys were even together when Carr became trapped.”).
112. See Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs. Ltd., 860 N.E.2d 280, 280 (2006).
113. Id. at 294.
114. Addison, 905 N.E.2d at 754-55 (“A significant distinction between Nicor and the
instant case is that Nicor primarily discussed affirmative acts of negligence rather than an
ongoing negligent omission. This court determined that the actions of each individual
technician in replacing the old regulators constituted a separate occurrence under the terms
of the insurance policy. We specifically rejected, as did the appellate court in that case, the
counter-argument that Nicor’s negligent systemwide failure to remove the regulators safely
constituted a single cause, and therefore a single occurrence.”).
115. Id. at 755 (“Focusing on the sole negligent omission of failing to secure the property
would allow two injuries, days or even weeks apart, to be considered one occurrence.”). 
116. Id. at 756.
court distinguished a 2006 decision in which a defendant-policy-
holder’s replacement of mercury-containing regulators went awry
in some cases, resulting in mercury spills and contamination.112
There, the court held that “where each asserted loss is the result of
a separate and intervening human act, whether negligent or
intentional, or each act increased the insured’s exposure to liability
... such loss ... [arises] from a separate occurrence.”113 Based on this
methodology, the insurer in Addison argued that the boys’ deaths
were the result of a single negligent act of failing to maintain the
property in a safe condition. But the Addison court saw no inconsis-
tency between its 2006 holding and a two-occurrence ruling in
Addison114 and was concerned that insisting on literal linkage
between a negligent act and an injury for every occurrence could
lead to absurd results.115
If the Addison court had stuck with this rationale alone, the
decision may have been less of a shot across the bow to insurers.
Instead, the court returned to its burden of proof theme, noting that
investigation had not produced reliable information regarding the
boys’ respective times of death or “how closely in time the boys
became trapped.”116 The Court noted that 
substantial uncertainty on this issue persuades us that Addison
cannot meets its burden of proving that the two boys’ injuries
were so closely linked in time and space as to be considered one
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117. Id. at 756-57.
118. See Maniloff, supra note 92.
The Addison Court essentially likened the insurer’s effort to limit its liability to
one occurrence to a policy exclusion—for which insurer’s [sic] traditionally have
the burden of proof. Number of occurrences is certainly not an issue in every
case and Addison may be distinguishable in future cases. But insurers’ efforts
to limit their liability, by means other than exclusions, arises regularly and in
all sorts of cases. The Addison Court’s sleight of hand with the burden of proof
may be its greatest impact.
Id.
119. See Sally Roberts, Ruling in Drownings Case May Spark More Occurrence Disputes:
Experts; Illinois High Court Rules Against Insurer on Cause of Deaths, BUS. INS., Feb. 2, 2009,
at 4, available at www.businessinsurance.com/article/20090201/ISSUE01/100027032 (quoting
Maniloff).
120. See id. (“Addison’s attorney ... said she believes that the court ‘drew the wrong
inference’ [and the] ‘most reasonable inference...was that this was one occurrence sufficiently
linked in every way.’” (second ellipsis in original)); id. (“The court ‘really did some gymnastics
here to make this two occurrences .... [A]lmost every court [using cause theory] ... would find
a single occurrence under these facts.’” (quoting Maniloff)).
121. See Maniloff, supra note 92. 
122. See id. (“Insurers on the losing end of coverage cases with tragic underlying facts often
feel that the court’s decision was prompted by its desire—of course, unstated—to maximize
coverage for the victims.”).
event. Because Addison cannot meet its burden, we hold that the
injuries to Carr and Hodgins constitute two occurrences.117
The insurer community’s reaction to the decision was harsh. One
commentator disagreed with the burden of persuasion analysis,
labeling it “sleight of hand,”118 and found the decision “amazing,”119
while others suggested that the court’s holding was well outside the
mainstream and the result of pro-policyholder “gymnastics.”120
According to critics, “the Illinois Supreme Court freely acknowl-
edged that it was looking to maximize coverage,”121 lending support
to the observation that judicial decisions in occurrence-counting
cases are often prompted by a simple desire to “maximize coverage
for the victims.”122
But despite the criticism, Addison almost certainly was correctly
decided. Applying the social instrument perspective to the coverage
dispute clarifies its correctness and demonstrates the manner in
which this additional perspective can assist in correctly resolving
coverage disputes. Although analyses of contract-based insurance
policies can of course reach the right result, they may not be
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particularly helpful. Judicial fixation on the standard insurance
policy language defining an occurrence does not readily yield an
answer. Most courts agree that the apt approach to occurrence-
counting is to determine the “cause” of the loss.123 But is bodily
injury or property damage “caused” by a bad management decision,
a bad product or service design, a bad performance, oversight,
manufacture, sales, shipment, or the impact of any of these on a
particular victim? 
Textual analysis of the policy alone is usually inconclusive. Even
when courts insist they are simply giving the policy plain meaning
construction, they are, at a minimum, considering the extrinsic
evidence provided by their own experience with losses of this type
and their common sense view of how an injury took place, often with
the help of expert investigation.124 Additional contract tools such
as the ambiguity principle and the assignment of burdens of
persuasion can help. But as insurer reaction to Addison indicates,
assignment of the burden of proof is often not a neutral act but
rather reflects a policy choice favoring one of the disputants at the
expense of another.
Rather than ignore the factors that underlie judicial determina-
tions styled in the language of contract alone, courts, insurers,
policyholders, lawyers, and regulators would be better off bringing
these factors into the open and assessing them expressly. This may
involve viewing the insurance policy not only as a contract, but also
as a product, or akin to a statute. Analysis certainly should involve
conscious reflection on the insurance policy’s function in relation to
larger socioeconomic risk management goals.
In cases involving general liability policies, the analysis is fairly
uncomplicated. Insurers designed the standard CGL to serve as “one
stop shopping” of sorts for businesses. For a larger premium than
they would have paid for owners’, landlords’, and tenants’ coverage
alone, or other coverages such as contractors’ public liability in-
surance, elevator liability insurance, or similarly targeted liability
policies, CGL insurance provides policyholders broad liability
coverage and defense of claims, which could now be left in the
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hands of experienced experts in litigation (the insurer and panel
counsel).125 CGL insurance allows policyholders to better participate
in useful economic or social activity without fear of bankruptcy or
distraction from lawsuits.
As part of this arrangement, the general liability policy must
provide adequate amounts of coverage so that claims can be settled
or paid if they cannot be defeated at trial. Thus, the per-occurrence
policy limit, styled as a “per accident” policy limit until the 1966
CGL revision, was established.126 For decades, many CGL insurers
did not even impose aggregate liability limits and were willing to
bear the risk that a given policyholder could face multiple suits
arising out of multiple accidents or occurrences during a policy
period.127 Over time, of course, rising tort awards pushed the
average per-occurrence limit upward, and insurers were forced to
protect themselves with aggregate limits and higher premiums. But
they had always been willing to shoulder the general liability risk,
for a price.
The resulting system was one in which most businesses, unless
foolish or large enough to safely self-insure, purchased substantial
amounts of CGL insurance, creating one of the most successful
insurance policies or products. In order to fulfill its function, the
CGL not only must have adequate limits but must provide coverage
for the types of liability-creating events created or faced by the
policyholder. This social instrument function of CGL insurance
provides a basis for erring on the side of finding more occurrences.
In addition, the CGL policy came to be seen as part of the social
safety net, providing a means of adequately compensating victims
of policyholder negligence. Most businesses would not be sufficiently
solvent, and certainly not sufficiently liquid, to pay large awards to
persons seriously injured or killed by the business’s activities.
Although this created pressure for courts to maximize coverage, this
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sentiment is not necessarily at odds with insurer industry goals, at
least in ordinary cases.128 Insurers have implicitly agreed not only
to protect policyholders but also to provide a type of compensation
fund for victims, as long as the insurer is adequately paid, in
premiums and investment income, for taking on this function in
society. In order to adequately compensate victims, each victim
should generally be subject to the policy’s per-occurrence limit.
Although this may come uncomfortably close to an effects test
rather than a cause test, this may suggest that strict adherence to
a narrow application of a cause test is too inconsistent with the
overall function of liability insurance.
As insurers are wont to complain, finding more occurrences
usually maximizes coverage.129 But as long as the insurer is not
forced to provide coverage without compensation, maximizing the
coverage is normally positive in that it better protects the
defendant-policyholder and better compensates the third party
victim of the policyholder’s conduct. In the occurrence-counting
disputes between insurer and policyholder, there is no question that
the policyholder has purchased coverage that applies to the under-
lying claim. The only questions are the number of occurrences and
the total coverage available. Insurers can hardly complain that they
were forced to provide free coverage. They sold policies to policyhold-
ers who experienced the unfortunate contingency for which they
bought protection. Under these circumstances, courts should adopt
an occurrence-counting methodology that maximizes the number of
occurrences in cases of reasonable dispute. Except in unusual
situations, insurers can both protect themselves and profit from this
approach by electing low aggregate limits as necessary, perhaps
even aggregate limits that match the per-occurrence limit if the risk
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facing the insurer is sufficiently difficult to underwrite or price.
When pricing is not a problem, insurers can “do the math” to
determine the premium required and refuse to issue policies
predicted to be unprofitable.
However, a methodology that finds multiple occurrences more
easily and more frequently does not always benefit the policyholder.
Policyholders may elect to reduce premium expenses through high
per-occurrence deductibles or retentions. When this takes place, a
decision finding multiple occurrences may force the policyholder to
pay more in deductibles or retentions, eliminating the value re-
ceived from the insurer’s defense of claims or payments for settle-
ments and judgments. Nonetheless, in such cases, courts generally
err more by trying to help the high deductible policyholder than in
simply taking a broad view of occurrence counting. By definition, a
policyholder opting for high per-occurrence deductibles has agreed
to self-insure a large portion of its standard business operation
risks.
In a case like Addison, this social instrument function of insur-
ance strongly supports the Illinois Supreme Court’s determination.
As discussed above, when the policyholder is willing to pay the
higher premiums required of a low- or no-deductible policy, it pur-
chases a social instrument that should, in theory, both protect the
policyholder from potentially company-killing liability and provide
adequate compensation to the victims of a policyholder’s negligence
or other wrongdoing.
There is nothing in the Addison case record to suggest that
policyholder Donald Parrish was a bad man or even that he was a
poor steward of his land. He may simply have been busy or inatten-
tive in failing to realize that his excavation pit had become a death
trap. Parrish was negligent130—but CGL insurance is designed to
protect policyholders, for a fee, from the most devastating financial
consequence of their negligence.131 Insurance, whether styled as
contract, product, or statute, is unquestionably expected to fulfill
certain functions in the aftermath of certain events. As the Addison
court correctly noted, the deaths of Carr and Hodgins resulted from
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the type of mishap that is squarely within the scope of the standard
CGL policy and within the contemplation of insurers, policyholders,
and regulators concerning CGL’s function.132 When tragedy struck
twice, Parrish was entitled to have his CGL policy play its intended
role as part of the local and national system of risk shifting and risk
distribution. 
Coverage should ordinarily follow, as necessary, up to the limits
of the policy, at least when the injuries suffered by the third party
claimant(s) justify the payments. Parrish paid for a policy with
$2 million in aggregate limits and the insurer agreed to provide this
amount if necessary to resolve any catastrophically tragic events for
which he could be held liable.133 When two victims with million-
dollar claims are killed under circumstances even suggesting
differentiation, resolving the case in favor of two occurrences is
much more consistent with the socioeconomic role anticipated for
the policy.134
When the defendant-policyholder’s insurer argues that the
policyholder should get less, the insurer is indeed seeking to elim-
inate a portion of the coverage. Elimination of coverage is what
exclusions do. Consequently, insurer attempts to invoke policy pro-
visions limiting coverage are in the nature of an exclusion and
should logically be treated as exclusions for purposes of burden of
proof, strict construction, and ambiguity analysis. The court in
Addison was correct to take this approach regarding insurer at-
tempts to invoke occurrence characterization to reduce or eliminate
coverage, and a similar burden would exist if the insurer attempted
to characterize the loss as subject to a lower sublimit or excluded
altogether because of the nature of the loss or liability.
Further, in a case like Addison, the consequences to both the
individual insurer and the insurance industry are not particularly
onerous. For the industry as a whole, the revenues involved in this
case are but a blip.135 Addison may spur snide commentary about
the Illinois Supreme Court, but the decision has only modest
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economic consequences to an individual insurer136 and only trivial
costs to the insurance industry.137 The circumstances of the loss are
sufficiently rare that insurers need not fear a rash of suits involving
two boys injured in close but not quite congruent circumstances.
More important, the insurer received premiums for $2 million of
aggregate coverage,138 acknowledging that there was a reasonably
high risk that more than one person could be seriously injured and
that more than one serious liability mishap could ensue during the
policy period. This is not a scenario like asbestos or environmental
liability in which insurers are likely to feel the cumulative negative
weight of a decision favorable to policyholder.139 Further, after
decisions like Addison, insurers are likely to either reduce limits,
increase premiums, or both. The Addison decision also may spur
sales of more policies at higher limits and premiums as policyhold-
ers are reminded of the risk any landowner faces.
Social instrument analysis also supports the court’s view that
insurance coverage for policyholders and their victims should not be
reduced due to hair-splitting calculations regarding the time and
circumstances of multiple injuries or deaths.140 As the court noted:
If several injuries suffered over the course of several weeks could
be bundled into a single occurrence, the likelihood that damages
would exceed a per-occurrence limit is significant, as demon-
strated by the damages in the instant case. Purchasers of
insurance such as Parrish would be left unprotected by their
insurance policy, and liable for any amount above the per-
occurrence limit. In accepting a per-occurrence limit, Parrish
could not have intended to expose himself to greater liability by
allowing multiple injuries, sustained over an open-ended time
period, to be subject to a single, per-occurrence limit [simply
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because the multiple injuries were rooted in a single cause such
as failure to safeguard property].141
Although perhaps fated to be hated by insurers, Addison’s basic
analysis is correct, though the opinion could be clearer and more
satisfying were it to address self-consciously the way in which its
holding is supported by the socioeconomic role of liability insurance
as a social instrument and social institution.
B. Plastics Engineering Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
A perhaps less controversial but probably more financially
important occurrence-counting case was also decided in early 2009.
In Plastics Engineering Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,142 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court faced an industrial-sized version of the
Addison v. Fay situation. Policyholder Plastics Engineering
Company (“Plenco”) manufactured and sold materials containing
asbestos during the 1950-1983 period and subsequently was sued
for alleged asbestos-related injury.143 “In general, the claimants
allege[d] that they were injured by their first exposure to asbestos,
but their asbestos-related injuries did not manifest until long after
their exposure to the asbestos. The claimants’ exposures allegedly
occurred at different times and at different geographical loca-
tions.”144 Among the insurers providing CGL coverage to Plenco was
Liberty Mutual, which sold primary policies covering the 1968-1989
period and umbrella excess policies for 1970-1984 and 1986-1988.145
For the most part, each primary policy had limits of $500,000 per-
occurrence and $500,000 annual aggregate, with a three-year policy
of $1 million per-occurrence and $1 million aggregate.146 The um-
brella policies had $1 million per-occurrence and $1 million annual
aggregate limits for 1970 through December 19, 1972, $5 million
per-occurrence and $5 million aggregate limits from December 19,
1972 to January 1, 1982, and $1 million per-occurrence and $1
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Guy v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 792 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 1986); Karjala v. Johns-
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period).
150. Liberty Mutual was protected, to a degree, by the policies’ “Non-Cumulation of
Liability” clause, which the court found to limit the amount of coverage owed on each
claimant’s injury to a maximum of the policy limits in effect at the time of first exposure to
the asbestos. See Plastics Eng’g, 759 N.W.2d at 619 (quoting clause); id. at 624-25 (construing
clause and rejecting argument that Wis. Stat. § 631.43(1) prohibits use of noncumulation
clause as “other insurance” provision to reduce coverage below aggregate protection provided
by multiple policies; statute applied only to concurrently overlapping insurance, rather than
to consecutively triggered insurance). Plenco was not permitted to “stack” triggered policy
limits. Id. However, the court also rejected the insurer’s argument that coverage available to
Plenco should be prorated across all years of the claimants’ injurious exposures. See id. at
million annual aggregate limits from January 1, 1982 to January 1,
1984.147 In the final three years, the limits increased to $10 million
per-occurrence and $10 million annual aggregate.148 Post-1988
umbrella and post-1989 primary policies contained exclusions for
asbestos-related liability.149
Even though Liberty Mutual was protected by annual aggregate
policy limits, much was at stake in Plastics Engineering. If Plenco’s
vending of products containing asbestos constituted one occurrence,
the maximum coverage responsibility of Liberty Mutual could be as
little as $500,000 despite the many claimants involved who had
been exposed across various years. Conversely, if each claimant’s
Plenco-linked injury constituted a separate occurrence, then there
were many occurrences, certainly more than enough to require
Liberty Mutual to pay its full aggregate limits for the years in
question, though perhaps not nearly enough to satisfy Plenco’s
asbestos-related liabilities.150 The filing of nine amicus briefs by
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Accepting Liberty Mutual’s allocation argument would have assigned some of the coverage
to calendar years in which Plenco had no available insurance due to either exhaustion of
coverage from other claims or Plenco’s failure to purchase sufficient insurance during those
years. In addition, Liberty Mutual’s apportionment argument, if accepted, would have
prorated the insurer’s duty to defend, a result that most courts have rejected, both because
it tends too greatly to gut the core of liability insurance (also described as “litigation
insurance” because of the duty to defend component, 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 4, § 9.03[A], at 9-63), and because the CGL policy language obligates the insurer
to defend “suits” rather than portions of suits. See id. § 9.03, at 9-90; see also Plastics Eng’g,
759 N.W.2d at 629 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (contending that majority decided more
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Create a Thicket of Potential Unfairness for Insurance Policyholders, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
769, 850-52 (1999) [hereinafter Stempel, Domtar Baby] (criticizing allocation across policy
years when it results in policyholder being unable to recover all insurance purchased). But
see Plastics Eng’g, 759 N.W.2d at 630 (Gableman, J., dissenting) (advocating application of
“time-on-the-risk” pro rata risk allocation). 
 This Article focuses on the Plastics Engineering analysis of the number of occurrences and
does not address the court’s other determinations.
151. See Plastics Eng’g, 759 N.W.2d at 614-15 (noting, inter alia, amicus briefs by
Wisconsin Insurance Alliance, London Market Insurers, Wisconsin Paper Council, United
Policyholders, National Federation of Independent Business, and Wisconsin Utilities
Association).
152. See id. at 620 (“Liberty Mutual argues that Plenco’s manufacture and sale of asbestos-
containing products without warning constitutes one occurrence regardless of the number of
people injured. Plenco, on the other hand, argues that each individual’s exposure to asbestos,
which results in injury, constitutes a single occurrence. Under Plenco’s argument, several
occurrences have taken place because many people have been exposed over the span of many
years. Given the policy language, we agree with Plenco and conclude that each individual’s
repeated exposure constitutes an occurrence.”).
153. See id.
154. See Plastics Eng’g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 466 F.Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (E.D. Wis.
2006).
entities affiliated with insurer or policyholder interests reflected the
importance of the issue to insurers and policyholders.151
Plenco tendered the asbestos claims to its insurers, and Liberty
Mutual argued that all claims and resulting litigation stemmed
from one occurrence—the use of asbestos in Plenco products.152
Plenco in turn sought a declaratory judgment that the asbestos
claims constituted multiple occurrences entitling it to full policy
limit coverage for the years in question.153 The action was initially
filed in federal district court,154 and the Seventh Circuit certified the
following question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court: “[W]hat con-
stitutes an ‘occurrence’ in an insurance contract when exposure
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159. See id. at 622 (“‘American courts have developed two basic approaches for assessing
the number of occurrences that took place within the meaning of policies’—the cause theory
and the effect theory.” (quoting, ironically perhaps, Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins.
Servs. Ltd., 860 N.E.2d 280, 287 (Ill. 2006), a case which the Illinois Supreme Court in
Addison Insurance Co. v. Fay took pains to explain did not require a finding that the two boys’
deaths were one occurrence, 905 N.E.2d 747, 755, 757 (Ill. 2009))). According to the Wisconsin
court, “[a]s long as the injuries stem from one proximate cause there is a single occurrence.”
Id. at 623 (quoting Welter v. Singer, 376 N.W.2d 84 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); citing Appalachian
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying Pennsylvania law)).
The court in Plastics Engineering is correct that the majority approach is to focus on the
causes of injury, rather than the effect of negligent conduct. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note
4, §§ 9.02-9.06; 1 OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 625; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 2.06[H], at 2-107. 
injuries are sustained by numerous individuals, at varying geo-
graphical locations, over many years[?]”155
The Wisconsin high court agreed with the policyholder, “conc-
lud[ing] that each individual’s repeated exposure constitute[d] an
occurrence.”156 The court’s professed approach was primarily
linguistic,157 although it may of course have been unconsciously
affected by a desire to maximize coverage, focusing on policy text.
The court noted that “claimants were allegedly injured by continu-
ous and repeated exposure to asbestos fibers from Plenco’s asbestos-
containing products” and that “without exposure, no bodily injury
takes place.”158
Looking to the cause of the claimant’s injuries,159 the court stated
that “‘where a single, uninterrupted cause results in all of the
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165. Id. at 620-21 (citing Fina, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d 547, 549-53
(N.D. Tex. 2002); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 765 A.2d 891, 896-909 (Conn.
2001)).
166. Id. at 621 (citing In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 158 F.3d 65, 79-83 (2d Cir. 1998)
(applying New York law); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178,
1212-14 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York and Texas law); Cole v. Celotex Corp., 588 So. 2d
376, 390-91 (La. Ct. App. 1991)); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 698 A.2d
1167, 1210-11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
167. Plastics Eng’g, 759 N.W.2d at 621.
injuries and damage, there is but one “accident” or “occurrence.”’”160
However, “‘[i]f the cause is interrupted or replaced by another cause,
the chain of causation is broken and there has been more than one
accident or occurrence.’”161 “[A] separate occurrence is not found
each time the same claimant is exposed to Plenco’s product.”162
The court recognized that judicial “determination of what
constitutes an occurrence in asbestos-related claims has produced
varying results throughout the country”163 and noted the nature of
the division between courts that “have concluded that it is the
manufacture and sale of asbestos-containing products that consti-
tutes the occurrence”164 while “[s]ome courts have concluded that
when exposure occurs at the same time and place, despite the fact
that many individuals are injured, there is but one occurrence per
time and place.”165 In addition, “courts have concluded that the
individual claimant’s repeated exposure to asbestos-containing
products constitutes the occurrence.”166 Although the Plastics
Engineering court professed to eschew adopting a particular school
of thought in favor of looking at the instant policies’ language,167 it
in essence adopted this last approach, finding “each individual
claimant’s injuries stem from the continued and repeated exposure
to asbestos-containing products” and that “[m]ultiple occurrences
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of those policies and coverage should not be reduced simply because the liability and damage
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its insurance. See Stempel, Domtar Baby, supra note 150.
arise because each individual’s injury stems from his or her
repeated exposure to asbestos-containing products.”168
The Plastics Engineering analysis is the correct—but not the
inevitable—construction to assign to the text of the standard CGL
policy. A court might reasonably, albeit in strained fashion, conclude
that the “accident” causing asbestos-related injury was the manu-
facture or sale of asbestos products and that this larger release of
asbestos into the marketplace was the “‘continuous or repeated
exposure’ to conditions” of which the policy language speaks.169 Such
an interpretation would be incorrect and inferior to the construction
adopted by the court in Plastics Engineering. But to understand the
reason why requires consideration of the nontextual aspects of the
CGL policy and its function as a social instrument.
Because the CGL policy serves social and economic functions by
encouraging commerce through distribution of business risks,
including defense and settlement of claims—the weak claims that
may merely harass a business as well as the strong claims that may
sink a business—the amount of CGL insurance available should, all
other things being equal, align with the policyholder’s risk exposure.
Obviously, CGL insurance is not free. Policyholders who fail to
purchase insurance, or purchase a finite amount of coverage that
proves inadequate in the face of serious claims problems, are not
entitled to coverage maximization through an unduly generous
construction of the term “occurrence.”170
However, when policyholders have CGL policies in place, they are
entitled to a reasonable application of the actual injury or inju-
rious exposure trigger, and courts should construe the number of
occurrences in accord with the liability risk actually faced by the
policyholder. Only injured humans can become plaintiffs and allege
bodily injury liability by the policyholder. Consequently, policy-
holder actions that create the basis for tort liability do not actually
ripen into potential tort liability (for example, a lawsuit) or actual
1532 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1489
171. See Stempel, Insurance Policy as Thing, supra note 9.
172. See Stempel, Insurance Policy as Statute, supra note 3, at 3-11.
tort liability (a settlement or judgment) unless a human being
alleges and/or proves injurious exposure to the policyholder’s
harmful product or negligent conduct.
In a variant of the famous, if perhaps sophomoric, philosophical
question “If a tree falls in the forest and no one hears, does it make
a sound?,” there can be no tort liability and no claim for insurance
coverage unless a person is impacted by policyholder conduct.
Negligence or other misconduct “in the air” is insufficient. Logically,
then, the potential amount of insurance available will be linked to
an individual claiming injury. Under this approach, claimed injury
caused by injurious exposure logically constitutes an occurrence, not
only because of the text of the CGL policy, but also because of the
policy’s structure, design, and purpose (the insurance policy as a
“product”),171 its quasi-governmental grant of rights by the insur-
ance industry in return for premiums from the commercial policy-
holder community (the insurance policy as quasi legislation),172 and
the socioeconomic institutional role played by the CGL policy. 
The CGL’s social instrumental role is to provide adequate,
baseline general liability coverage for risks faced by commercial
policyholders. If the policyholder does not skimp on purchasing
coverage (for example, buy an amount of insurance clearly smaller
than the norm for its type of business), the social institutional role
of the policy should provide the policyholder with the per-occurrence
policy limits when it faces a claim that might, on its own, consume
those policy limits. If the purchaser of a CGL has its policy limits
effectively reduced or compressed by undue judicial focus on negli-
gence or misconduct (for example, distributing a product containing
asbestos) rather than on what makes the negligence liability-
creating (its interaction with a third party to cause bodily injury),
the CGL policy then fails to fulfill its socioeconomic role in providing
adequate protection (up to the policy limits) when facing suit. 
When the tort exposure in question involves many claimants who
were exposed to asbestos over many years, the analysis remains the
same. In such cases, the expected institutional role of CGL insur-
ance is to treat each claimant as a separate occurrence requiring a
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173. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
174. 938 A.2d 286 (Pa. 2007).
175. Id. at 288.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 288-89.
litigation response, possible settlement, and, if necessary, trial and
payment of an adverse judgment. The insurer can easily limit its
exposure through the use of aggregate policy limits and a noncumu-
lation of liability clause. Indeed, Liberty Mutual’s policies at issue
in Plastics Engineering had both.173 If courts were to give liability
insurers the benefit of an initial hidden policy sub-limit by accepting
the telescoping cause/occurrence theory advanced by Liberty Mutual
and other insurers, this would tend to thwart the role of the CGL
policy as social instrument. The Plastics Engineering analysis,
therefore, clearly is correct when seen in light of the insurance
policy’s social institutional role, even though the decision could be
attacked on linguistic grounds alone.
C. Baumhammers and Koikos
In contrast to Addison and Plastics Engineering, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2007 provided an example of
excessive compression of the number of occurrences. In Donegal
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Baumhammers, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court embraced a rather narrow concept of the “cause” of loss test
for purposes of determining the number of “occurrences,” and,
hence, the number of liability limits available under a general
liability policy.174
On April 28, 2000, Richard Baumhammers went on an extended
shooting rampage during which he killed five people and seriously
injured another.175 Baumhammers was convicted of five counts of
first degree murder and one count of aggravated assault and
attempted murder.176 The victims and their estates sought damages
from Baumhammers and his parents, alleging that the parents
negligently failed to confiscate Baumhammers’s gun, procure
mental health treatment for him, and advise the proper authorities
of his violent propensities.177 The parents sought coverage under
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178. Id. at 289.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 290.
182. Id.
183. The Superior Court adopted the Third Circuit’s rationale in Nationwide Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying Pennsylvania law). Donegal
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 893 A.2d 797, 808 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
184. Baumhammers, 893 A.2d at 814.
185. See Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2003).
186. Baumhammers, 893 A.2d at 815.
187. Id. at 815, 817.
their homeowners policy.178 The policy provided a $300,000 per
“occurrence” liability limit and defined an “occurrence” as an
“accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substan-
tially the same general harmful conditions.”179 Insurer Donegal
commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination
that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the parents.180 At the
trial level, the court found against Donegal, holding that Donegal
had a duty to defend and indemnify the parents and that the
allegations constituted six occurrences under the Donegal policy.181
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, following re-argu-
ment en banc, affirmed the trial court’s decision on both issues.182
The Superior Court held that the parents’ alleged negligence
constituted an accident, satisfying the policy’s “occurrence” defini-
tion, despite the fact that the ultimate injuries were caused by
Baumhammers’s intentional acts.183 Then, purporting to apply the
“cause” test for determining the number of occurrences, the Superior
Court noted that there were two proximate causes of the victims’
injuries: Baumhammers’s attacks and Baumhammers’s parents’
negligence.184 The Superior Court was persuaded by the rationale
used by courts185 that found multiple occurrences by focusing on the
“immediate cause of the harm, the cause that ultimately triggered
the liability of the insured.”186 Looking to the “immediate injury-
producing act,” the Superior Court determined that there were six
occurrences because Baumhammers shot six victims.187 The court
rejected Donegal’s argument that the parents’ negligence consti-
tuted a “continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful conditions” because the victims were not “exposed”
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190. First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on its 2006 decision in Kvaerner Metals
v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006), as well as Third Circuit
precedent and affirmed the portion of the Superior Court’s decision that found that there was
an alleged “accident” that satisfied the Donegal policy’s definition of an “occurrence.” Donegal
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 292-93 (Pa. 2007). Citing Kvaerner, the court
stated that it defined an “accident” in the context of insurance coverage as “an unexpected and
undesirable event occurring unintentionally.” Id. at 292. The court stated that the
“extraordinary shooting spree embarked upon by Baumhammers resulting in injuries to
Plaintiffs cannot be said to be the natural and expected result of Parents [sic] alleged acts of
negligence.” Id. at 293. Rather, the court determined that the shooting spree was unexpected
and, therefore, constituted an accident as required under the policy’s definition of an
“occurrence.” Id. Donegal, therefore, was obligated to defend the parents in the action against
them. Addressing this key issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that courts have
utilized two principal tests for determining the number of occurrences at issue: the “cause”
test (the majority view) and the “effect” test. Id. at 293 n.5. The court acknowledged that,
although it had yet to adopt the “cause” test, the Superior Court had concluded on numerous
occasions that the “cause” test should be followed by Pennsylvania courts. Id. at 294; see, e.g.,
Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. Allen, 708 A.2d 828, 833 (Pa. Super. 1998) (failing to prevent abuse
of three children was one “occurrence”); D’Auria v. Zurich Ins. Co., 507 A.2d 857, 860-61 (Pa.
Super. 1986) (adopting the cause of loss test to determine that misdiagnosis and mishandling
of patient was one “occurrence”). 
191. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 295-96.
192. Id. at 295.
193. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Baumhammers found persuasive the Nevada
Supreme Court’s application of the “cause” test in its 1994 decision in Washoe County v.
Transcontinental Insurance Co., 878 P.2d 306, 307 (Nev. 1994). Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at
295. In Washoe, a day-care center employee allegedly had sexually abused children at the
center over a three year period. Washoe, 878 P.2d at 307. Plaintiffs alleged that Washoe
County negligently licensed the day-care center during the time period in which the abuse
to the parents’ negligence.188 Therefore, given Donegal’s $300,000
per-occurrence limit of liability, the court determined Donegal’s
potential indemnity exposure was $1.8 million.189
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed in part the Superior
Court’s decision regarding the number of occurrences and policy
limits implicated.190 Noting that Baumhammers is “a disturbing
case with tragic consequences,” the court found that only one
“occurrence” had been alleged.191 Rejecting the Superior Court’s
application of the “cause” test, to the extent that it relied on the
“immediate injury-producing act,” the Supreme Court stated that
“the act of the insured that gave rise to their liability should be the
focus.”192 The parents’ negligence constituted one accident and,
therefore, one “occurrence” as defined by the Donegal policy.193
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took place. Id. at 308-09. Determining that Washoe’s negligent licensing of the day care center
was the “cause” of the children’s injuries, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that, because
“each of the separate instances of molestation arises from the same proximate cause”—the
County’s alleged negligence—that negligence was a single occurrence. Id. at 308.
194. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d at 294.
195. Id. at 296.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. As Baumhammers demonstrated, occurrences potentially can make millions of dollars
of difference in the amount of coverage applicable to a loss. In many cases, the high-low range
of occurrence-counting is far greater than in Baumhammers. For example, what if the son had
shot fifty people? 
Although policyholders were handed a defeat in Baumhammers, all was not lost.
Baumhammers surely will be used by policyholders to argue that, when the issue is “number
of deductibles,” the court’s same rationale should lead to a decision that only one deductible
applies. Occurrence-counting cases are particularly hard to classify. In general, at least prior
to Baumhammers, it could be said that court decisions took a view of cause that maximized
coverage, finding fewer occurrences when there were substantial deductibles or retentions to
satisfy and finding more occurrences when this benefited the policyholder. It remains to be
seen whether Baumhammers will introduce a less pro-policyholder regime to this often
inconsistent area of insurance law.
Formally adopting the “cause” test for determination of the
number of occurrences, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
the number of occurrences is determined by reference to the
particular insured’s act.194 This act, rather than the insured’s act or
the acts causing injury, gives rise to a particular insured’s
liability.195 The court explained that determining the number of
occurrences in this manner “recognizes that the question of the
extent of coverage rests upon the contractual obligation of the
insurer to the insured.”196 The parents’ coverage was determined by
the accident over which the parents could exercise control—here,
their negligent failure to confiscate their son’s weapon or to notify
the proper authorities of his violent propensities.197 Thus, according
to the court, the causal inquiry in the case had to focus on parental
failure to supervise rather than the specific acts of destruction.198
The son himself could not benefit from insurance coverage because
he had intentionally inflicted injury upon others, whereas the
parents were only negligent in failing to attempt to impede the son’s
rampage.199
The Baumhammers decision conflicts with the Illinois Supreme
Court’s approach in Addison and that of the Wisconsin Supreme
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200. See Addison Ins. Co. v. Fay, 905 N.E.2d 747 (Ill. 2009); Plastics Eng’g Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. 759, N.W.2d 613 (Wis. 2009).
201. 849 So.2d 263, 264-65 (Fla. 2003).
202. Id. at 265.
203. Id. at 271-72.
204. Id. at 273.
205. See supra text accompanying note 179.
206. See Koikos, 849 So. 2d 263; Addison Ins. Co. v. Fay, 905 N.E.2d 747 (Ill. 2009); Plastics
Eng’g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 759 N.W.2d 613 (Wis. 2009).
Court in Plastics Engineering.200 Baumhammers is in even more
direct conflict with the Florida Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in
Koikos v. Travelers Insurance Co., a case which involved a shooting
at a fraternity party from which the assailant had been ejected.201
The victims sued the policyholder, a restaurant owner, alleging that
the restaurant where the party was held had provided inadequate
security on the premises.202 The Florida court applied a cause test
and reasoned that no bodily injury resulted from an occurrence
until the assailant discharged his weapon and hit someone.203
Consequently, Koikos held that the separate shootings of separate
people were separate occurrences, resulting in more than one
occurrence, even under the cause test.204
In contrast to Baumhammers, Koikos, Addison, and Plastics
Engineering are consistent with the great bulk of occurrence-
counting decisions involving asbestos—decisions which reasoned
that the cause of bodily injury due to an occurrence was not merely
the manufacture or distribution of asbestos but also its ingestion
by the victim/plaintiff. All apply a form of cause analysis, but the
gulf between them is substantial. The Koikos/Addison/Plastics
Engineering line of cases maximizes coverage for policyholders in
cases in which the policies had no deductible or only a modest
deductible. By contrast, Baumhammers applied cause analysis
only to the definition of occurrence,205 and concluded that parental
failure to stop a gunman’s shooting spree was the same general
“harmful condition.” The other three cases, however, concluded that
the harmful conditions differed depending on whether a third party
victim was felled by a bullet, quicksand, or asbestos.206 The occur-
rence was not the underlying negligence or misconduct of the
1538 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1489
207. The difference between the Koikos and Baumhammers approaches and results is also
ironic in that Koikos involved shootings of separate victims within a few seconds of time
whereas Richard Baumhammers conducted his grisly activities, seemingly aimed at victims
who were members of racial or minority groups, over the course of two hours and at separate
locations. A layperson would be justified in thinking that the case outcomes should have been
reversed. But insurance law is highly state-specific, as these decisions demonstrate.
208. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
209. 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 1.06[A].
210. Id.
policyholder but its combination with particular injury to the
victim.207
One might also explain Baumhammers using a legal realist
analysis. Recall that the theory of liability in Baumhammers is the
failure of two innocent policyholders (the parents) to control a
culpable policyholder (the homicidal son), who was not himself
entitled to coverage.208 Although such failure-to-supervise claims
against innocent policyholders have long been accepted, they are, of
course, recognized as a means of avoiding the bar to coverage
presented by insurance policy requirements that inflicted injury be
accidental, unintentional, and unexpected, rather than planned or
controlled.209
Despite the long pedigree of these tort actions and attendant
insurance coverage, courts and policymakers have never been
completely comfortable with them. In effect, the insurer in
Baumhammers was asked to pay for a policyholder’s despicably
criminal carnage via suing co-policyholders. This result conflicts
with the principle that insurance should only be available for events
of chance.210 But permitting such actions at least provides some
compensation to the victims. Unless Baumhammers’s parents were
relatively wealthy, the only realistic source of victim compensation
would have been their insurance. Seen in this light, one could, at
the risk of psychoanalyzing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see
the decision as a compromise. The court rejected insurer arguments
that would completely defeat coverage but was unwilling to define
the number of occurrences in a manner that would effectively
expand $300,000 of coverage into $1.8 million of coverage. However,
courts are uncomfortable permitting liability claims for failure to
supervise a co-insured or failure to warn potential victims. It would
be far more honest and comprehensible to address these concerns
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211. Insurers have in fact done this to a large degree, replacing previous exclusions for
intentional injury by “the” insured with exclusion if the intentional injury is perpetrated by
“any” insured, a linguistic change usually enforced by the courts. See, e.g., Noland v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 892 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Ark. 1995); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 980 P.2d 685,
687 (Utah 1999); see also FISCHER, SWISCHER & STEMPEL, supra note 4, § 10.01 at 584-86;
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 1.06[B](1)(d)(i). 
In addition, insurers have added criminal acts and drunk driving exclusions as a means of
avoiding risks similar to those in Baumhammers and Koikos. See Douglas R. Richmond,
Drunk in the Serbonian Bog: Intoxicated Drivers’ Deaths as Insurance Accidents, 32 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 83, 98-99, 122 (2008) (noting success of insurer use of such exclusions; finding
noncoverage is the majority rule, but arguing against aggressive application of such
exclusions because almost all drunk driving deaths are accidental within the meaning of
accident policies); Gary Schuman, Dying Under the Influence: Drunk Driving and Accidental
Death Insurance, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 6 (2008); see, e.g., Stamp v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying federal common law) (denying coverage and
holding policyholder’s death nonaccidental when arising out of crash in which the policyholder
was intoxicated); Eckelberry v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying
federal common law) (same); Nelson v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 962 F. Supp. 1010,
1013 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (applying same self-inflicted injury exclusion to policyholder injured
while driving drunk). But see King v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994 (8th Cir.
2005) (applying federal common law) (reversing administrator’s decision that drunk driving
death was not accidental and remanding for trial on fact issues related to accidental nature
of death); West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 856, 865-906 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (holding
policyholder’s death while driving drunk sufficiently accidental for coverage). 
Arguably, these exclusions are inconsistent with the social instrument function of insurance
policies. But if the limitations are clearly expressed in the policy language, courts are
reluctant not to enforce such limitations. State insurance regulators could refuse to approve
policies with this language but may find that the social instrument function is better served
by removing coverage in these cases even if it results in reduced compensation to those
injured by such conduct. 
as part of the “expected or intended injury” exclusion found in most
general liability policies. In addition, of course, insurers can
structure the policy so that it clearly excludes failure to supervise
claims or denies coverage whenever there is intent to injure or
criminal misconduct by “any” insured.211
If the two shooting spree decisions, and the issue of occurrence-
counting, are examined under the lens of insurance policies as social
instruments, the Koikos approach is more satisfying and consistent
with the overall liability insurance regime. The very design of basic
liability policies, the statute-like architecture of the policy, focuses
on injury as the coverage trigger and injury as the covered event.
Negligence in the air is not sufficient to trigger coverage. Similarly,
the per-occurrence policy limits (and their cousins, the per-person
policy limits in auto liability policies) link policy benefits and
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212. To be sure, this approach can be carried too far and become an effects-based analysis.
For example, if a homicidal insured such as Richard Baumhammers had detonated a bomb
in a public square, treating each victim as a separate occurrence would unduly multiply the
number of occurrences. But when there is separation between causal events and injury, there
logically is more than one occurrence. If Baumhammers had planted six bombs throughout
Philadelphia or built a bomb that exploded in stages, causing different injury to different
people at sufficiently separated, noncontiguous times, it would seem too much to say that the
only cause was his bomb-making spree or his parents’ failure to detect it.
available coverage to the number of injury events, rather than to the
number of negligence events.212 The negligence of Baumhammers’s
parents, standing alone, injured no one. Richard Baumhammers
could have been hit by a car on the way to do his mischief, or could
have been subdued by the police or shot in self defense by an
intended victim. No one was injured until Baumhammer’s shots
found their marks. Similarly, inadequate security at the Tallahas-
see restaurant in Koikos did not, in itself, result in any bodily
injury. Only when the inadequate security permitted a trespasser
to shoot someone did injury occur. 
Viewing the liability insurance regime as a socioeconomic in-
strument that is part of a wide-ranging system of risk management
and distribution underscores this point. The focus of the liability
insurance product, and liability insurers as a whole, is on injury
caused by nonfeasance or misfeasance, not upon the absence of care
standing alone. Consequently, to be consistent with the liability
insurance system, courts must focus primarily on behavior that
causes injury in a direct fashion, rather than looking too far back
down the causal chain and unduly limiting the number of occur-
rences under the policy.
Policyholders purchase liability insurance to protect themselves
from claims, not from incidents. Consequently, determinations of
available insurance should focus on injuries to claimants rather
than negligence in the air, no matter how neatly this may fit the
modern preferred focus on the “cause” of liability. Although this may
constitute a strong brief for abandoning cause analysis in favor of a
return to effects analysis, this need not be the case. For example,
even under an analysis such as that used in Koikos, Addison, and
Plastics Engineering, a factory explosion could be regarded as one
occurrence because it so obviously is the single cause of any injury
inflicted and any claims that will follow. Nonetheless, appreciating
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the role of insurance policies as socioeconomic instruments sug-
gests not only that the Koikos/Addison/Plastics Engineering line of
cases is more persuasive than cases like Baumhammers, but also
that effects analysis may provide a clearer, more predictable, fairer
means of counting occurrences in a manner more consistent with
the social institutional role of liability insurance. Because insurers
now routinely limit their total responsibility for policyholder tort
exposure through aggregate limits, this approach will not result in
undue imposition of financial burden on insurers. In fact, this
approach may benefit insurers through its greater predictability and
creation of incentives for insurers to adequately price the CGL
product and receive sufficient premiums from policyholders.
The question of deductibles and policyholder retentions of liability
remains. To a degree, policyholders have talked out of both sides of
their metaphorical mouths regarding occurrence counting, usually
seeking a finding of multiple occurrences to maximize coverage, but
occasionally arguing for a finding of fewer or a single occurrence in
order to avoid the application of multiple per-occurrence deductibles
or retentions. If a consistently injury-centered standard for assess-
ing occurrences emerges, insurers not only are forewarned regard-
ing aggregate limits and adequate premiums, but policyholders are
also forewarned that they should consider seeking and paying for
smaller deductible of retention amounts in order to benefit from the
occurrence calculation regime. Alternatively, when policyholders are
willing to accept greater risk themselves and treat their liability
insurance more as a “catastrophic” insurance product, rather than
something to cover almost all liability claims, policyholders can rest
secure in the knowledge that when they need more than one per-
occurrence limit to respond adequately to a catastrophic tort
situation, the courts are likely to give it to them.
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213. See 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 14.01.
214. See id.; REJDA, supra note 14, at 44-45 (discussing identification of particular loss
exposures as part of risk management); id. at 108-12 (discussing design of insurance policy
to cover or exclude particular risks); SAWYER, supra note 12, at 20-21, 31, 42-44;
TRIESCHMANN ET AL., supra note 14, at 43-52 (noting different types of risk exposures and
correspondingly different types of policies); id. at 112-32 (discussing use of insurance policy
design to cover or avoid certain risks); VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 25-46; John
H. Eglof, Comprehensive Liability Insurance, the Outside, BEST’S INS. NEWS, May 1941, at 19
(“[With the CGL policy the] burden of determining what to insure and what not to insure is
removed from the shoulders of the insured and placed squarely on the producer and the
carrier. How much better it is to say—‘We cover everything except this and this and
this—’instead of ‘We cover only this and this and this.’ ... Since a risk cannot choose the kind
of accident that will give rise to the need for liability insurance, it is wise to be protected
against all losses under one policy—One policy—one premium and worry regarding liability
insurance is off his mind.”).
215. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 4, at 517; 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 4, § 14.01.
216. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, app. A (showing that the 1986 CGL Form adds a
broad asbestos exclusion); 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 14.01[A];
Stempel, Coverage Carnage, at 358.
217. The exclusion of nuclear-related liability or loss has been a standard fixture of both
liability and property insurance policies for nearly as long as nuclear power has been used to
III. CONSTRUING INSURANCE POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THEIR SOCIAL
INSTRUMENT FUNCTION: ADDITIONAL APPLIED EXAMPLES
A. Business Risk Exclusions in General Liability Policies
The function of the standard CGL policy has long been to provide
protection for the business operations of commercial policyholders.213
In crafting the CGL product/statute, the insurance industry tailors
the product to provide broad coverage to make it attractive to
policyholders and to command larger premiums than could be
charged for a narrower product.214 However, to protect themselves
from risks that would make the CGL unprofitable or its claims
exposure insufficiently predictable, insurers have also tailored the
product by exempting from coverage particular risks that are
either thought to be too difficult, at least at the prices policyholders
are willing to pay, or better addressed by other policies.215 The
exclusion for all asbestos-related claims, added in 1986, is an
example of a difficult risk excised from coverage.216 So, too, is the
standard exclusion for liability related to nuclear operations.217
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generate electricity. Its rationale is similarly reflected in the Price-Anderson Act, a federal
statute enacted in 1957 that limits the liability of nuclear power plants. See Price-Anderson
Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000));
Samuel B. Hardy, Commentary, Federal Subsidy of Adjudicative Right Determination: The
New Cost Shifting of Nuclear Power Litigation, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1705, 1705-06 (2008).
218. See ISO Properties, CGL Policy Form CG 00 01 10 01, Exclusion C (ISO 2000),
reprinted in FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 4, app. E [hereinafter ISO CGL Policy]
(stating that CGL coverage does not apply when policyholder is held liable due to “(1) Causing
or contributing to the intoxication of any person; (2) The furnishing of alcoholic beverages to
a person under the legal drinking age or under the influence of alcohol; or (3) Any statute,
ordinance or regulation relating to the sale, gift, distribution or use of alcoholic beverages”);
infra Part III.C (discussing the liquor liability exclusion). However, the exclusion “applies only
if [the policyholder is] in the business of manufacturing, distributing, selling, serving or
furnishing alcoholic beverages.” 150 CGL Policy, supra, Exclusion C. In other words, the
exclusion aims to remove liquor liability coverage for policyholders such as bars and
restaurants and thus requires these types of businesses to purchase a separate liquor liability
policy. This policy will be separately underwritten and priced in view of the differences
between this type of risk exposure and the ordinary risk exposures covered by the CGL policy.
219. See 150 CGL Policy, supra note 218, Exclusion G (excluding coverage for injury
“arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any aircraft, ‘auto’
or watercraft owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured” including both
“operation and ‘loading or unloading’”). 
220. Exclusion D of the standard CGL policy excludes “workers’ compensation and similar
laws,” whereas Exclusion E excludes employer liability for bodily injury to employees of the
policyholder arising out of workplace duties. See id. Exclusions D, E. These exclusions are
designed to carve risks out of the CGL policy, risks to be covered by other types of policies
serving different socioeconomic roles and filling different niches in socioeconomic activity.
221. See id. Exclusions C, D, G. 
222. Of course, compensating injured persons through liability insurance rather than
through first-party insurance—for example, life, health, and disability—or insurance-like
government programs—for example, Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security—is generally
thought to be less efficient. However, until people are more widely protected through
government risk distribution or injury compensation programs or are required to purchase
adequate amounts of first-party insurance, there remains high risk that tort victims will not
Other exclusions strip the CGL policy of dram shop liability,218 auto
liability,219 or workers’ compensation liability,220 all risks for which
the policyholder may obtain coverage, but not through a standard
CGL policy.221
Seen in this light, we find the standard form CGL policy provides
business actors with the basic protection they need to go into
business without fear of bankruptcy from incurring liability to third
parties such as patrons and bystanders. In addition, if sufficiently
purchased, the CGL policy provides protection to the public much
like mandatory auto insurance protects other drivers from possible
injury inflicted by insured drivers.222 Although CGL insurance is not
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be adequately compensated. Just as an impecunious person can do great damage behind the
wheel, under-capitalized businesses or businesses confronted with mass tort liability may be
unable to adequately compensate victims.
223. See, e.g., Burlington Ins. Co. v. Oceanic Design & Constr. Inc., 383 F.3d 940, 948 (9th
Cir. 2004) (applying Hawaii law) (noting and applying distinction); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Bldg. Constr. Enters., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1010 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (same), aff’d,
526 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 2008); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Woodside Homes Corp., 448 F. Supp. 2d
1275, 1280 (D. Utah. 2006) (same); Centex Homes Corp. v. Prestressed Sys., Inc., 444 So. 2d
66, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (same); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tillerson, 777 N.E.2d
986, 991 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (same); Qualls v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 462 N.E.2d 1288, 1291
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (same); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 791 (N.J. 1979)
(leading case discussing distinction and concept of business risk exclusion of CGL coverage);
Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2007) (noting distinction
but finding it inapplicable to case at hand); see also 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 4, § 25.05[B][2]; Robert J. Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship
Claims Under Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 785, 786 (1995);
Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed Operations—
What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 441 (1971) (observing that the CGL
policy was designed to provide coverage for “tort liability for physical damages to others and
not for contractual liability of the insured for economic loss because the product or completed
work is not that for which the damaged person bargained”); Ellen S. Pryor, The Economic Loss
Rule and Liability Insurance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 905, 910-11 (2006).
224. 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 14.02[B].
225. See id. § 14.13[A].
legally mandated, it is required as a practical matter for most
entities. Businesses may scrimp a bit and buy lower liability limits
than advisable, but few go bare unless they are large enough to self-
insure.
But a general liability policy, as insurers are fond of reminding
policyholders and courts, is not a performance bond.223 The policy is
designed to defend against suits by third parties claiming bodily
injury or property damage but not to guarantee the quality of the
policyholder’s work.224 The general liability policy is not designed to
refund the customer’s purchase price or to redo the policyholder’s
substandard work.225 Consequently, the CGL’s broad insuring
agreement is curtailed by several “business risk” exclusions that
deny coverage when alleged damage is limited to the policyholder’s
“own work” or “own property” or when the injured material qualifies
as “impaired property” that can be easily made good as new through
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226. See ISO CGL Policy, supra note 218. In particular, Exclusions J (damage to
policyholder’s own property), K (damages to policyholder’s own product), L (damage to
policyholder’s own work), and M (damage to impaired property that is “not physically injured”)
operate, along with the product recall exclusion (discussed in the ensuing footnote), as the
CGL policy’s business risk exclusions. Id.
227. See id. Exclusion N. In simple, nontragic form, this exclusion operates to prevent the
CGL policy from becoming a performance bond by requiring the policyholder to shoulder the
costs of some deficiency in its product that requires a recall, just as the CGL policy would not
cover a policyholder’s need to refund the purchase price of its products. However, product
recall, which is very expensive, is often used in lieu of refunds when the product in the field
may be dangerous. In perhaps the most famous example, Tylenol maker McNeilab, a
subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, recalled all Tylenol products in 1982 in the wake of a
deranged poisoner tampering with its products in the Chicago area. After recall, the old
Tylenol packaging was replaced by tamper-proof packaging and a new product was reissued.
Despite the fact that these actions are credited with Tylenol’s ability to weather the incident
and continue as a dominant market participant, the McNeilab/Johnson & Johnson CGL
policies did not cover the costs of product recall and redesign. See McNeilab, Inc. v. N. River
Ins. Co., 831 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1987); McNeilab, Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 525
(D.N.J. 1986). As the trial court noted in granting summary judgment to the insurer, product
recall insurance was generally available in the marketplace as a type of insurance purchased
separately from the CGL, though often as part of a package of insurance policies designed to
cover the policyholder’s range of risks. McNeilab, 645 F. Supp. at 540.
228. See 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 25.01.
229. See id.; see, e.g., Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 137 P.3d 486, 495
(Kan. 2006) (finding unforeseen, unintended property damage from leaking windows installed
by subcontractor covered occurrence under general contractor’s CGL policy); Lamar Homes,
Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d at 1, 9 (Tex. 2007); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 78-79 (Wis. 2004) (same regarding damage to building
foundation from settling due to subcontractor’s negligent soil preparation). But see Kvaerner
Metals Div. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 899 (Pa. 2006) (finding that all
damage to property due to consequences of subcontractor’s negligent work was excluded as
general contractor’s own work); L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 621 S.E.2d 33,
36 (S.C. 2005) (same). 
a simple replacement of the policyholder’s defective performance.226
In addition, product recall is excluded from coverage.227
In the wake of substantial construction defect litigation during
the past three decades, insurers seeking to deny coverage when
builders are sued by disgruntled home buyers have frequently
invoked the business risk exclusions.228 For the most part, the courts
have correctly applied the CGL, providing coverage when the home-
owner alleges that it suffered damage to something other than a
particular part of the home on which the policyholder performed
construction.229 For example, if the policyholder sued is a roofer and
the allegation is that the roof is composed of cheap shingles that will
wear out quickly, the claim is not covered. The claim alleges no
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230. These are the facts of one of the leading cases involving lack of CGL coverage for
business risks. In Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, the policyholder applied substandard stucco, rather
than shingles, to a home. 405 A.2d 788, 789 (N.J. 1979). The homeowner was dissatisfied and
sued to have the stucco fixed, but the vendor’s CGL provided no coverage because it was only
the vendor’s own product that was injured, without physical injury to anything else in the
house, and because the unsightly, substandard stucco, even if it was an eyesore, inflicted no
bodily injury. Id. at 796.
231. The standard CGL policy defines “property damage” covered under the policy as
“physical injury to tangible property.” See ISO CGL Policy, supra note 218, Definition 17. If
the only problem is that the shingles are ugly or the wrong color, the vast majority of courts
would view this as an insufficient physical injury even in the absence of the business risk
exclusions. The 1966 revision to the standard CGL form specifically added this definition to
overrule prior cases that had found property damage when doors were ill-fitting or
unattractive despite being serviceable. See 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note
4, § 25.05[B]. 
232. This is because “impaired property” is defined in the CGL policy as property (for
example, the house) that is less useful because it incorporates the product or work but “can
be restored to use” through “repair, replacement, adjustment or removal” of the policyholder’s
product or work or through the policyholder “fulfilling the terms of the contract or agreement.”
See ISO CGL Policy, supra note 218, Definition 8. In this hypothetical, the problem can be
solved by replacing the shingles to satisfy the contract and restore the home to the condition
intended. If, however, removing and replacing the shingles would invariably injure other parts
of the home, the cost of remedying that damage is covered under the CGL policy. See 2
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 14.13[C].
233. See 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, §§ 14.13[C], 25.01; see, e.g.,
Lee Builders, 137 P.3d at 495 (finding unforeseen, unintended property damage from leaking
windows installed by subcontractor to be a covered occurrence under general contractor’s CGL
policy); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Home Pride Cos., Inc., 684 N.W.2d 571, 580 (Neb. 2004) (same
regarding damage to other portions of building due to negligent installation of roof shingles);
Lamar Homes, 242 S.W.3d at 9 (finding damage to portions of home beyond subcontractor’s
faulty work covered under CGL policy).
property damage to anything other than the policyholder’s work.230
Further, the roof arguably is not afflicted with any “physical injury
to tangible property,” the definition of property damage,231 but
instead is simply substandard. If the cheap shingles can be removed
and replaced without undue collateral damage to other parts of the
house, the impaired property exclusion may even apply.232 However,
if the homeowner alleges that the poor roofing job resulted in a
leaky roof, which allowed water intrusion that damaged other parts
of the home, the claim logically is covered because it alleges physical
injury to physical parts of the home other than the roof.233
When a policyholder-defendant is the general contractor rather
than a specialized subcontractor, the entire home arguably is the
policyholder’s own work. As a result, prior to 1986, insurers seeking
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234. See 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, §§ 14.13, 25.01, 25.05.
235. See id. § 14.13.
236. See, e.g., O’Shaughnessy v. Smuckler Corp., 543 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996);
Lamar Homes, 242 S.W.3d at 12; Am. Family Mut. Ins. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 82
(Wis. 2004); Kalchthaler v. Keller Constr. Co., 591 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that general contractor’s CGL policy provides coverage for defective work by
subcontractor). 
237. This phrase is adopted from Henderson, supra note 223.
238. See Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs. Ltd., 860 N.E.2d 280, 293 (Ill.
2006).
239. See, e.g., Kvaerner Metals Div. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 899 (Pa.
2006) (holding that all damage to property due to consequences of subcontractor’s negligent
work was excluded as general contractor’s own work); L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 621 S.E.2d 33, 36-37 (S.C. 2005) (same). 
to bar coverage for general contractors sued by purchasers over
construction defects tended to prevail.234 However, in the 1986
revisions to the standard CGL policy form, the insurance industry
and commercial policyholder interests reached an accord in which
the “your work” exclusion was revised to create an exception to the
exclusion when the allegedly defective work was “performed on [the
general contractor’s] behalf by a subcontractor.”235 Because the vast
bulk of construction work today is done through subcontractors,
with most general contractors operating as administrators (or
“briefcase contractors”) rather than hands-on builders, the net effect
of the 1986 form language is to cover construction claims under the
standard CGL policies issued to general contractors.236
As a result, most construction defect suits implicate liability
insurance coverage, at least when the plaintiff is alleging something
more than problems with the defendant’s workmanship. When the
defendant is accused not simply of the accident of faulty workman-
ship, but of faulty workmanship that causes an accident,237 CGL
coverage normally obtains,238 although significant numbers of courts
have erred and held, in unreasonably sweeping language, that any
suit against a construction entity for construction defects is an
attempt to turn the CGL policy into a performance bond.239 An
appreciation of the role of the CGL policy as a social instrument
fulfilling a particular role in the risk management of a construction
vendor strengthens the case for the majority approach and likely
would reduce the number of erroneous decisions.
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240. See, e.g., O’Shaughnessy, 543 N.W.2d at 104; Lamar Homes, 242 S.W.3d at 9; Am. Girl,
673 N.W.2d at 78; Kalchthaler, 591 N.W.2d at 173. 
241. See ISO CGL Policy, supra note 218; 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note
4, §§ 14.01[A][2], 14.13.
242. See ISO CGL Policy, supra note 218, Exclusion A (stating that CGL insurance does
not apply to injury “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured” but that
exclusion does not apply to bodily injury “resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect
persons or property”).
243. 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 25.05[B].
244. See id.
B. What Constitutes a Sufficiently Fortuitous “Occurrence” or
“Accident,” and the Problem of “Expected or Intended” Injury
Insurers for construction contractors have also attempted to
deny coverage for builders sued over construction defects by arguing
that a suit for defective construction cannot be covered because it
cannot be the result of an “accident” or was otherwise insufficiently
fortuitous to qualify as an insured risk. Although it is an axiom of
insurance that insurance only covers fortuitous risks and that one
cannot normally insure against a certainty or intentional loss,
courts have concluded that the insurer’s position in such cases is
unfounded.240 The definition of “occurrence,” found in most stan-
dard CGL policies, defines an occurrence as an “accident,” including
“continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
harmful conditions”—language intended to convey that insurance
coverage is not lost simply because the accident does not happen
abruptly or reach its conclusion quickly.241 On top of this, standard
CGL policies typically exclude coverage when the plaintiff’s injury
was “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.”242
In essence, then, the structure of the CGL policy, consistent with
insurance theory, seeks to bar coverage when the policyholder’s
conduct leading to injury was not accidental but intentional.243
Insurers seeking to avoid coverage in construction defect cases have
sought to stretch this concept by arguing that, because construction
defects arise from volitional commercial conduct by the policyholder-
builder, the alleged defect and its consequences are insufficiently
accidental to merit insurance coverage.244 The insurers are incorrect.
Unless the policyholder intentionally and knowingly performed
construction work with the aim of causing injury to the plaintiff,
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245. See supra notes 236, 240 and accompanying text; see also 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE
CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 25.05[B]. 
246. See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Woodside Homes Corp., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1282,
1287 (D. Utah 2006); Kvaerner Metals Div. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 899
(Pa. 2006) (finding that all damage to property due to consequences of subcontractor negligent
work excluded as general contractor’s own work); L-J, Inc. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 621 S.E.2d 33, 36-37 (S.C. 2005). 
248. See Minn. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 805 A.2d 622, 624-26 (Pa. 2002) (finding no
coverage for drug dealer’s neglect to seek medical assistance when customer apparently
overdosed and died in sleep). Although the drug dealer in Greenfield was, of course, not a
model citizen and was intentionally selling drugs, there was no evidence in the case that he
intended to kill a customer or even expected her to die.
usually the homeowner, neither the “expected or intended” exclusion
nor the definition of “occurrence” should bar coverage.245
Simply because a policyholder voluntarily engages in an activity
hardly means that any adverse consequences of the activity are
intended or nonaccidental. For example, automobile drivers leaving
for work, grocery shopping, or other errands are, of course, getting
behind the wheel voluntarily. It is no accident that they are using
their cars. But if they are involved in a collision on the way to work,
the store, etc., it can hardly be said that the event was nonac-
cidental simply because they made the volitional decision to drive
the car. Similarly, a policyholder-builder intends to build things,
but, unless the builder consciously tries to make the building
substandard, it can hardly be said that problems with the resulting
construction are nonaccidental or that resulting injury was expected
or intended by the builder.
As with the business risk exclusions, courts have generally
rejected inappropriate liability insurer efforts to avoid coverage on
fortuity based defenses.246 But a disturbing number of courts have
taken the insurers’ bait and unwisely ruled that bad consequences
of ordinary business activities are somehow outside the scope of
general liability insurance.247 If these courts had possessed an
adequate appreciation of the historical design, purpose, and function
of the CGL policy and its role as a social and economic instrument
crucial to the functioning of the modern construction industry, there
would have been less likelihood of error. Similar judicial error
occurs with the fortuity or accident requirement in consumer
insurance policies.248 However, the bulk of courts recognize that
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249. Accord Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht, 490 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Iowa 1992) (en banc) (refusing
to apply expected injury limitation to claim arising out of playground spat involving eleven-
year-old boys); see, e.g., N.M. v. Daniel E., 175 P.3d 566, 570-72 (Utah 2008) (holding that
expected or intended exclusion does not bar coverage for injuries resulting from a nine-year-
old boy’s response to teasing at ice hockey camp; the boy intended to use a hockey stick to
intimidate others into leaving him alone but did not intend to inflict resulting head injury).
Opinions like Daniel E. and Haht would be close, or even suspect, calls if the incident had
involved adults or teenagers but seem correctly decided in situations involving younger
children less able to envision the effects of their actions. These sentiments are expressed by
the Haht majority. Haht, 490 N.W.2d at 846 (“We in no way retreat from [previous precedent
finding intent to injure in adult fight cases]; we merely hold [that] it does not apply on this
policy in these special circumstances. [To apply that precedent] here would grossly
overemphasize the vauge, uncertain meanderings in the mind of an eleven-year-old child
involved in a playground spat.”); see, e.g., Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Blazer, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1080,
1086-89 (D. Nev. 1999) (applying assault and battery and liquor liability exclusions to claim
arising out of bar room altercation).
250. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
there is a difference between overly aggressive or stupid behavior
and intent to injure.249
Appreciating that general liability policies are designed to protect
businesses when their daily activities produce losses and claims
illuminates the dividing line between uncovered intended injury and
accidental damage from poorly performed work. Because the CGL
is so designed, terms in the insuring agreement such as “accidental”
need to be reasonably construed in a manner consistent with the
social instrument function of the policy. When an insurer wants to
exclude coverage for such liability, this must be done clearly so as
not to disappoint the objectively reasonable expectations of the
policyholder facing potentially company wrecking liability litigation.
This construct—that mishaps growing out of volitional activity
usually are sufficiently “accidental” for liability insurance purposes
—seems unassailable in light of the social instrument function
served by liability insurance in modern society. For both businesses
and individuals, basic liability protection against claims arising out
of their daily activities has come to be an assumed near-essential.
However, when individuals or entities step too far outside the range
of ordinary conduct and engage in knowing or intentional inju-
rious behavior, they also step outside the social instrument func-
tion of liability insurance and are no longer within coverage.250
Consequently, the homeowner who shoots a neighbor over a bound-
ary dispute or the driver who intentionally rams another vehicle
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251. See infra notes 252-53.
252. See, e.g., Cockrell v. Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying
Arkansas law) (finding policyholder shot by wife suffered accidental injury within meaning
of policy because he did not seek to be injured or expect to be injured); Smith v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc’y, 614 F.2d 720, 722-24 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Wyoming law) (holding
policyholder shot during property dispute with neighbor was covered under accidental death
policy); McElyea v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 960, 964-65, 968 (E.D. Ark. 2004)
(holding policyholder’s death in shooting sufficiently accidental and not subject to felony
exclusion even if policyholder was aggressor contributing to tragic scenario); Freeman v.
Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 286 N.E.2d 396, 397-98 (Ind. 1972) (denying summary judgment
to insurer despite evidence that policyholder killed in fight was the aggressor); Stogsdill v.
Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (same); Terry v. Nat’l
Farmers Union Life Ins. Co., 356 P.2d 975, 976-79 (Mont. 1960) (finding policyholder’s death
from fistfight at card game sufficiently accidental); see also Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 225
A.2d 532, 535-37 (Pa. 1967) (holding policyholder’s death from overdose of narcotics
accidental). But see Minn. Fire & Cas. v. Greenfield, 855 A.2d 854, 860-61 (Pa. 2004) (tacitly
overruling Beckham, at least in part, in context of drug dealer’s claim for coverage in wrongful
death claim arising out of overdose by customer). 
253. See, e.g., Jennings v. Jennings, 109 F.3d 477, 479-81 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying
Arkansas law) (holding policyholder’s death to be nonaccidental when shot by divorced wife
in self-defense); Freed v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 551 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying
Mississippi law) (recognizing no accidental death in which policyholder was aggressor in
incident leading to his killing by another); McCrary v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.2d 790, 792-94
(8th Cir. 1936) (applying Nebraska law) (holding policyholder’s death to be nonaccidental
when he was shot and killed by a jealous husband interrupting policyholder and killer’s wife
in bed); see also Byrd v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 415 A.2d 807, 808-09 (D.C. 1980) (affirming
that policyholder shot by police during shootout not victim of accidental injury); Carlyle v.
Equity Benefit Life Ins. Co., 551 P.2d 663, 664, 667 (Okla. Civ. App. 1976) (concluding that
policyholder’s death not accidental when shot attempting to escape after robbery). Cases like
properly loses coverage. But the homeowner or driver who merely
defends himself in an altercation fits comfortably within the social
instrument penumbra of liability insurance and logically would be
entitled to coverage even if the policy’s “intentional act” exclusion
lacked a specific self-defense exception.251
First-party accident policies present a variant problem as to
whether the policyholder is covered when intentionally victimized
by a third party. For example, the policyholder may be on the re-
ceiving end of a bullet from an ornery neighbor in the hypothetical
property dispute noted in the previous paragraph. In such cases,
does the policyholder’s Accidental Death and Dismemberment policy
provide coverage? Although most courts correctly conclude that
the policyholder should be paid,252 a surprising number of courts
take the formal, excessively metaphysical view that the deadly or
injurious incident was not an “accident.”253 Appreciating the social
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Byrd and Carlyle also can be explained by “commission of a felony,” “crime,” or “illegal act,”
exclusions found in many accident policies as well as judicial invocation of a public policy
rationale against subsidizing criminals through insurance. Cases like McCrary, of course, are
additionally problematic given the notion of a wife as chattel that can be permissibly
“defended” by force. 
254. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
255. This is perhaps a stretch. Homeowners thinking about inviting friends for dinner
probably do not consider the liability implications of such entertaining. But, at least since the
1950s, they have had liability coverage should a guest become injured through slipping on a
treacherous floor, from ptomaine poisoning, from a falling light fixture, and so forth. If the
homeowner is asked to host the senior class graduation party for her son’s high school, she
may very well consider the liability implications and might decline in the absence of the
personal liability protection afforded by homeowners insurance. Even with such coverage, she
probably will be reasonably vigilant in attempting to prevent or limit alcohol consumption at
the party because of the greater risks posed and the absence of this type of coverage in the
standard homeowners policy.
256. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at
174-78; id. at 177 (“[Insurers] folded CPL [consumer personal liability] coverage into
residential property insurance policies, and sold the two forms of coverage in a single package
.... [in homeowners insurance, which was] becoming effectively mandatory for an increasing
portion of the population during this period.... In 1950 there were 17 million mortgaged
residences; by 1959 there were 46 million. All of these were likely purchasers of personal
insurance that had a liability insurance component.”).
257. See DORFMAN, supra note 14, at 254-70; REJDA, supra note 14, at 350-64, 411. 
258. By either the policy terms or applicable state law, most life insurance policies are
required to cover suicide deaths so long as the suicide does not take place within the first two
years of the policy. The rationale for this treatment posits that the two year waiting period
instrument function of accident insurance demonstrates that such
decisions are in error.
First-party accident insurance holds a less central role in society
than general liability insurance and is a more problematic product.
As noted above, liability insurance is, to a large degree, a lubricant
for the wheels of commerce and individual activity.254 Without it,
there would be less economic activity, less driving, and perhaps even
less social hospitality.255 Further, strong existing social institutions
(for example, state legislators and lenders) have effectively man-
dated such coverage in many instances.256 By contrast, accident
insurance is less widely imposed and is generally considered one of
the less effective first-party insurance products. Rather than buying
an accidental death policy, the average person is better off spending
the money on a regular life insurance policy.257 The former covers
only death due to mishap while the latter includes death from
illness, injury, and in most cases even suicide.258 Although the
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is sufficiently long to minimize the adverse selection that might result from depressed or
suicidal persons demonstrating a disproportionate interest in obtaining life insurance. In
addition, by policy terms and state law, life insurance policies generally become
“incontestable” after two years, meaning that coverage cannot be denied on the basis of any
applicant misrepresentations made in connection with issuance of the policy. See REJDA,
supra note 14, at 396-97; 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, §§ 18.03,
18.05[A]; ANDREW TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS: EVERYTHING THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
NEVER WANTED YOU TO KNOW 12b (1982). 
259. In comparing the cost of insurance, a typical metric is the amount of premium paid
for each $1000 or $10,000 in coverage. By these standards, regular life insurance premiums
are usually substantially higher than accidental death insurance premiums and standard
disability insurance premiums are usually dramatically higher than accidental injury
premiums. This results, of course, in large part because the risk of being killed or injured by
any cause is larger than the risk of being killed or injured only in an “accident.” See infra note
260 and accompanying text. In addition, accident policies tend to have more limited policy
benefits. For example, an accidental injury policy may pay a fixed amount or pay for only a
few months of lost work due to the accidental injury. By contrast, a disability policy may pay
benefits for years, typically to a maximum of age 65, if the disability is long-term. Regular
disability insurance is considered particularly expensive and hard to underwrite because of
heightened risks of adverse selection and ex post moral hazard. An injured policyholder with
sufficient insurance may be relatively unmotivated to work hard at rehabilitation for a
quicker return to work even if the person presented little ex ante moral hazard because he
would be unlikely to want to endure the pain of injury. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 46-47,
65-66, 227-30. 
260. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEATHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2006, 57 NAT’L
VITAL STATISTICS REP. 1, 32-35 (2009).
261. Some of the cases litigating the “accident” concept, of course, involve liability
insurance, such as in the business risk CGL policy cases discussed earlier in this Part. See
supra Part III.A. In addition, a significant number of regular life or disability policies appear
to pay enhanced benefits, the fabled “double indemnity” provision being typical in some
policies, if death or disability stems from an accident. But even if these cases are not
considered, there remain a large number of reported decisions addressing the question of
whether an occurrence is sufficiently accidental to be covered under a straight accidental
death/injury policy. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
regular life insurance policy is more expensive,259 it is worth the cost
because it covers much more and provides a means of financial
planning and saving. Statistically, the average person is far more
likely to die of disease or natural causes than from an accident.260
Consequently, the accidental death or injury policy does not play
the same central social instrument role found with regular life
insurance or general liability insurance. But this is not to say that
it plays no social role. The many reported court decisions litigating
the meaning of “accident” suggest that accidental death and injury
coverage policies are widespread.261 For less sophisticated persons
of modest means, the accident policy, like the auto or homeowners
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262. Regular life and disability insurance policies generally are considered to be relatively
“upscale” products sold disproportionately to higher income persons, who also are generally
better educated persons with more access to financial planning information. However,
although many employers provide workers with group life and disability insurance, typical
group life insurance policy limits are low ($50,000 or less is common and the death benefit
rarely exceeds $100,000), and group disability coverage is normally basic rather than
enhanced. For example, under an enhanced disability policy, the policyholder is eligible for
benefits if she is unable to return to her specific occupation (for example, trial lawyer,
orthopedic surgeon). Under the basic disability policy, benefits cease when the policyholder
is able to engage in any job. See, e.g., Dowdle v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 407 F.3d 967, 968-69, 972
(8th Cir. 2005) (applying Minnesota law) (holding that, under enhanced policy, orthopedic
surgeon injured in plane crash entitled to full benefits because he could no longer operate due
to back pain even though he could engage in office consultations; providing example of
disproportionate levels of physician compensation: as surgeon, Dr. Dowdle earned more than
$1 million per year, as an office doctor, his pay was more than 80 percent lower).
263. I became aware of this relatively low profile but significant marketing of accident
insurance while working on a case in which the accident insurer refused to provide coverage
when the policyholder was shot and killed by a neighbor with whom he had had a long
running feud. 
During the course of discovery, it was revealed that the insurer sold most of its accidental
death and dismemberment polices through credit unions or similar savings institutions as a
common means of marketing accident policies. The marketing advantage for insurers is that
it provides access to a customer base through a trusted intermediary (the credit union), which
may be willing to pay the insurer to provide a modest accident policy (for example, $2000) as
an inducement for deposits. From that, the insurer may simply suggest that the policyholder
purchase additional accident coverage for a relatively low monthly premium that can be
policy, may be all they can afford.262 The accident policy premiums
are substantially lower than regular life or disability premiums and
provide at least some protection from the most serious risks facing
a policyholder. As a result, even though holders of accident policies
would almost always be better off with standard life or disability
policies, the accident policy plays a significant social institutional
role for at least some significant segment of the populace.
Although accident policies are not as widely woven into the social
fabric as basic property, liability, or medical coverage, accident
insurers have, like other insurers, used marketing strategies to
attempt to integrate their products into daily life. For example,
accident insurers working with credit unions frequently provide a
small amount of accident insurance as a benefit to depositors. With
this toehold, insurers, through the credit union, offer to sell addi-
tional insurance for a comparatively low premium, usually col-
lected monthly through the funds on deposit with the financial
institution.263 For depositors, accident insurance then becomes
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automatically deducted from the policyholder’s savings account, making premium payment
rather invisible and painless to the policyholder regardless of the value of the policy. 
For example, in the case in which I was involved, the monthly premium for a $50,000
accidental death/injury policy was less than $6 per month, an amount that would hardly be
missed from even a small savings account. But at approximately $70 per year for $50,000 in
coverage (plus inflation upgrades and $2000 in coverage provided for “free” by the credit
union), the policy probably was not a very good deal. For about the same premium, a regular
life policy with broader benefits could have been purchased. But regardless of whether it is
a good deal or bad deal, accidental death policies like these function as social instruments.
Even if regulators or consumer advocates would prefer that consumers spend their premium
dollars differently, there is no public policy case for giving such policies restrictive
construction.
264. See John Dwight Ingram & Lynne R. Ostfeld, The Distinction Between Accidental
Means and Accidental Results in Accidental Death Insurance, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 13-19
(1984) (collecting illustrative cases); see, e.g., supra note 263. See generally Adam F. Scales,
Man, God and the Serbonian Bog: The Evolution of Accidental Death Insurance, 86 IOWA L.
something like the personal liability protection acquired as an
adjunct to the homeowners policy required by the bank or the auto
policy required by the state. In light of this reality, accident
insurance looks more like regular life or disability insurance in its
socially instrumental role of providing some modest protection for
average persons.
Appreciating the social institution aspects of even the lowly first-
party accident policy makes it clear that, as long as death or injury
is unexpected by the policyholder, it is clearly “accidental” for
purposes of these policies, even if the person or entity intentionally
caused the death or injury or knew that its actions would certainly
inflict harm. Take, for example, the case of an accident policyholder
who is murdered or injured in a mugging. If a court looks only at the
word “accident,” which is not defined in the typical accidental
death/injury policy, one can reasonably say that the event was not
the type of incident generally thought of as an accident by reason-
able laypersons. For example, if a friend is shot by a burglar, most
of us would not say that he was “hurt in an accident.” Although the
shooting may have resulted from clearly accidental events (for
example, the burglar tripped and unintentionally discharged the
gun or panicked when the friend appeared at the top of the stairs),
in most cases such injuries were not unintended or unexpected by
the perpetrator. 
For some courts, these elements of nonfortuity remove the
incident from the accidental and prevent coverage.264 Other courts
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REV. 173 (2000).
265. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 1998)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Blumer v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 4:08CV924MLM,
2008 WL 5110570, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 3, 2008); Brumley v. Lee, 963 P.2d 1224, 1229-33
(Kan. 1998); see also Ingram & Ostfeld, supra note 264, at 13-19 (gathering cases).
266. See, e.g., Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 533, 538-44 (Md. 2000); Fox v.
Country Mut. Ins. Co., 964 P.2d 997, 999-1000 (Or. 1998); Roque v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
467 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Pa. 1983) (holding accidental or unexpected quality of event is “to be
determined from the viewpoint of the insured” rather than the perpetrator); Republic Nat.
Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. 1976); see also Ingram & Ostfeld, supra
note 264, at 13-19 (gathering cases). 
267. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 7.9, 7.10 (3d ed. 2004)
(noting proper use of nontextual considerations in assessing policy meaning); FISCHER,
SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 322 (same); 1STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra
note 4, §§ 4.01-4.09 (same); see also STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION §§ 2.2, 4.1-4.5, 5.2 (2008) (same); Schwarcz, supra note 9 (advocating test for
determining when policy is defective product subject to reinterpretation in favor of
policyholder); Stempel, Insurance Policy as Thing, supra note 9 (asserting that insurance
policy interpretation can be improved by appreciating that standard form policies function as
products); Stempel, Insurance Policy as Statute, supra note 3, at 14-15 (suggesting that
standardized policies are type of private legislation that of which interpretation can be
improved by applying statutory construction theory and methods).
have avoided this result by treating the word “accident” as suffi-
ciently ambiguous to mandate coverage, particularly since the
insurer failed to define the word.265 Others have focused on the
victim’s vantage point or the reasonable expectations of the
policyholder.266 Although these coverage-finding decisions are
correct and certainly better jurisprudence than decisions stripping
the innocent victim of coverage, they can rely too greatly on the
ambiguity doctrine or may seek a just result at the expense of
fidelity to policy language. One response to this criticism, of course,
is that neither insurance policies nor other contracts should be
construed solely upon the text.267 In addition, consideration of the
social instrument function of accident insurance should silence this
concern. 
For the policyholder and society, accidental death/injury insur-
ance, whatever its limitations as a product, plays an important
socioeconomic role. It is designed to protect the policyholder and
dependents from sudden injury or death. It provides compensation
that reduces the prospect that the policyholder or dependants will
need government assistance in the wake of income loss and medical
bills. This coverage is particularly beneficial often to persons who
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268. Life and disability policies frequently contain a war risk exclusion that precludes
coverage if the death or injury arises out of battlefield hostilities, but otherwise do not restrict
benefits based on the cause of death or injury. See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at
22.
269. For example, an accidental death policy may require that the policyholder die within
a certain number of days after an accident or that a medical response to an accident take
place within a set time in order to be covered under the accident policy. See supra note 80.
270. See supra note 80. But see Kirk v. Fin. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 389 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ill.
1978) (enforcing ninety day time limit requirement for coverage where patient died ninety-two
days after accident). 
271. Accord FARNSWORTH, supra note 184, §§ 4.28, 5.1; see FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL,
supra note 4, § 2.10; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 4.10.
272. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return
of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 757, 762-65 (2004).
are close to the economic edge should they suffer injury or a death
in the family. Although not hardwired into the economy like
liability, property, or medical insurance, accident insurance plays
a similar, if diminished, role. The basic social function of the
accident policy would be thwarted if the policy were deemed not to
apply simply because the party inflicting injury or death acted
volitionally. Just as a regular life or disability policy provides
coverage if the policyholder is attacked,268 an accident policy that
serves as a diminished proxy for such policies should logically
provide coverage even if philosophers may disagree as to the
accidental quality of the injurious incident. 
In similar fashion, if the accident policy is to properly fulfill its
social instrument function, accidental death policies that require
death to occur within a specified time after an incident should not
be strictly enforced.269 Courts have tended to reach the right result
in such cases, but they have generally done so by invoking concepts
of unconscionability and public policy,270 decisions which can be
made to look like undue judicial activism. Although in apt cases
contract terms can be validly set aside because a term is unconscio-
nable or violates public policy,271 it is generally acknowledged that
courts should use these rationales sparingly since they contravene
an acknowledged part of the contract.272 By contrast, the social
instrument perspective does not eliminate or revise a term but
instead construes the term with an appreciation of the socio-
economic role of the insurance policy. Properly applied, the social
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273. See supra note 218 (citing and quoting exclusion).
274. See supra note 218.
275. Some policyholders have had some success in fighting the exclusion using the opposite
tack:
Courts have refused to apply the exclusion, for example, to injuries arising out
of the sale or serving of alcoholic beverages by churches or other nonprofit
organizations at social functions or fund-raising activities, on the grounds that
these organizations are not in the business of serving or selling alcoholic
beverages. In response to these decisions, the ISO developed an optional
endorsement that insurers can add to the policy when they anticipate a liquor
liability exposure. The Amendment of Liquor Liability Exclusion endorsement
(CG 21 50) expands the exclusion to eliminate coverage for anyone who serves
alcoholic beverages for a charge, whether or not the activity is for the purpose
of financial gain. This includes a variety of fund-raising and social activities
instrument perspective is a modest extension of the notion that
standardized contracts often operate as products more than agree-
ments and of the concept that contracts should be construed in light
of their purpose, party understanding, and policyholder expecta-
tions. 
C. Liquor Liability 
One common exclusion to the CGL policy illustrates the degree to
which the social instrument function of the standard liability policy
supports application of an exclusion, although one could argue with
some force that the exclusion violates the reasonable expectations
of the policyholder or defeats the overall purpose of the CGL policy.
The standard CGL policy contains a liquor liability exclusion
barring coverage for any claims arising out of the service or
consumption of alcohol.273 In fact, the exclusion expressly states that
it applies only to policyholders in the business of “manufacturing,
distributing, selling, serving or furnishing alcoholic beverages.”274
Although the language of the exclusion is quite clear, it can be
argued that, when the policyholder is a bar, restaurant, convenience
store, or even a grocery store—most of which now carry at least
beer and wine for sale—the exclusion for liquor liability in a CGL
policy runs counter to the reasonable expectations of the policy-
holder who, like most businesses, expects to have general liability
insurance protection for the basic array of civil liability risks facing
the business.275
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sponsored by nonprofit organizations. If the insurer is willing, the exposure can
be covered by scheduling the specific functions at which the liquor will be sold
using the Amendment of Liquor Liability Exclusion—Exception for Scheduled
Activities endorsement (CG 21 51).
VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 615.
276. See, e.g., W. Heritage Ins. Co. v. River Entm’t, 998 F.2d 311, 313-15 (5th Cir. 1993)
(applying Texas law); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Kutchins Enters., Inc., No. 4:08-CV-
143-A, 2008 WL 5381244, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2008); Frost v. David, 673 So. 2d 340,
344 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
277. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Holsten, No. 95-3035, 1995 WL 647263 (4th Cir.
Sept. 26, 1996) (applying West Virginia law); Lampliter Dinner Theater, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 1036, 1039, 1041-46 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying Alabama law)
(acknowledging reasonable expectations argument but finding it unavailing in light of clear
policy language). Under other circumstances, courts have been willing to apply such
exclusions even though the exclusion negates coverage for a regular and ongoing activity of
the policyholder, but courts then hold the policyholder’s broker or agent liable for procuring
an inadequate policy. See, e.g., Third Eye Blind, Inc. v. Near N. Entm’t Ins. Servs., LLC, 26
Cal. Rptr. 3d 452, 457-58 (2005).
278. See Stempel, Insurance Contract as Thing, supra note 9.
Although courts facing the issue have tended to reject this
argument and instead have relied on the clear language of the
liquor liability exclusion,276 their rationale for upholding the
exclusion tends to be unsatisfactory for the usual reason: linguistic
literalism is usually unsatisfactory, especially when applied to an
exclusion which is construed against the insurer and on which the
insurer bears the burden of persuasion. Further, like most exclu-
sions in most policies, the liquor liability exclusion probably goes
unread by all but the most sophisticated policyholders and their
agents. In other situations in which liability from a core risk-
creating function of the policyholder is excluded, courts have been
considerably more likely to find coverage.277
When one looks beyond a purely textual approach and takes a
broader contract approach, the case for excluding liquor liability
improves because the purpose of the policy, and certainly the
insurance industry intent, is not to cover dram shop-style actions in
the CGL form but instead to underwrite, price, and cover these
risks separately. Similarly, viewing the insurance policy as a
product increases the persuasiveness of the argument for excluding
coverage.278 Although the CGL product was generally intended to
provide broad coverage, the product has long contained a clearly
written liquor liability exclusion that is now well-known to brokers
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279. See generally Stempel, Insurance Policy as Statute, supra note 3.
280. See DORFMAN, supra note 14, at 369-70 (noting divergence between liquor liability of
social host and commercial vendor of alcohol); REJDA, supra note 14, at 307 (noting that liquor
liability exclusion applies only to policyholders in the business of serving alcohol but that
“[c]overage can be obtained by firms in the liquor manufacturing and distribution business
by adding the liquor liability coverage form to the policy”); TRIESCHMANN ET AL., supra note
14, at 205; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 615.
281. Accord REJDA, supra note 14, at 307; TRIESCHMANN ET AL., supra note 14, at 205; see
VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 620-21 (noting that liquor-related liability, including
sales incident to social and charitable events, “may be covered by endorsement to the CGL,
or they may be covered under a Dram Shop or Liquor Liability Policy”).
282. See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 620 n.17. 
and experienced policyholders. In like fashion, viewing the insur-
ance policy as akin to a statute or private legislation governing the
policyholder-insurer risk distribution relationship strengthens the
case for exclusion.279
The insurance industry is more than willing to underwrite dram
shop coverage, but its arrangement with the policyholder and broker
community is such that the coverage must be separately underwrit-
ten and priced, rather than being included within the broad scheme
of the CGL policy and generally priced based on overall sales,
number of employees, square footage of stores, or other statistics. By
contrast, insuring against liquor liability requires some knowledge
of the policyholder’s operation, track record, and liquor dispensing
routine—details not generally inquired about in the CGL applica-
tion process.280
In addition to illuminating the benefits of the insurance-as-
product and insurance-as-statute approaches, viewing the insurance
policy as a social instrument strengthens the case for enforcing the
liquor liability exclusion. General liability policies protect policy-
holders from routine, but threatening, risks inherent in operating
the business and also provide a means of compensating victims,
the poorest of which are unlikely to have adequate life, health, or
disability insurance. However, the underwriting and claims risks
presented by liquor liability are of a different genre, not only
justifying industry reluctance to add it on to the CGL at minimal or
no cost,281 but also justifying society’s preference that these risks be
more particularly assessed so that dram shop underwriting provides
some deterrence and risk management benefits that may reduce
total social losses from alcohol related mishaps.282
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283. Think of a wrong-side-of-the-tracks convenience store selling Jack Daniels to a teenage
driver who joyrides through Greenwich, Connecticut “taking out” two investment bankers, a
doctor, and a lawyer.
284. See 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 22.12[G].
The risk of liquor liability is different from the risk of a slip-and-
fall injury to a patron or an unsafe parking lot. The patron inebri-
ated by the policyholder’s alcohol products can inflict injury not only
on himself but also on many others. An underage patron may
purchase a fifth of vodka or down eight cocktails, but, rather than
simply suffering individual injury, like most other general liability
victims, our hypothetical young drunk can get behind the wheel of
a multi-ton vehicle and kill or maim several other potentially high-
income victims, whose economic losses may result in giant-sized
liability awards that far outstrip any losses the policyholder vendor
could realistically inflict on its patrons.283
The risks and the consequences of liquor liability are sufficiently
different than most general liability risks such that insurers want
to examine liquor liability risk separately. Policyholders should
actively focus on the policy limits needed, as well as their policies
requiring identification for youthful purchasers or refusing to
serve or sell to patrons who appear to have already approached or
passed their limit. The overall risk management system for food
and beverage vendors is designed to separate liquor liability
coverage from general liability coverage. Appreciating this separa-
tion reinforces the correctness of most judicial decisions, but does so
in a way that negates concern that the literal “fine print” of the
exclusion has been unreasonably used to defeat legitimate policy-
holder expectations.
D. Inherent Diminished Value Automobile Damage Claims
There is another example in which noting the social instrument
function of the basic automobile policy engenders considerable
sympathy for insurers. Consider the contention of some policyhold-
ers that automobile insurance should compensate them after a
crash, not only for the cost to physically repair their vehicles, but
also for the diminished market value of a car that has been in an
accident.284
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285. See id. § 22-86.6, n.227 (collecting cases on both sides of issue). Compare State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. 2001) (holding that proper measure of
collision damages is the inherent diminution of vehicle’s market value compared to value of
equivalent car that had not been in accident), with Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co.,
819 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2002) (holding that proper measure of value is amount necessary to fully
repair or replace vehicle as required by extent of collision damage), both cases reprinted in
FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 4, at 912-26.
286. See 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 22.12[G]. Although a
substantial number of courts take the opposing view, there has been relatively little scholarly
writing on the subject, although such discussion tends (like my analysis) to reject recovery for
inherent diminished market value of a vehicle. Thomas Farrish argues that the plaintiffs’
arguments in diminished value cases suffer from two problems: (1) “[T]he plaintiffs’
construction does indeed negate the insurer’s option to choose the lesser of two payment
methods. Because it renders another portion of the contract inoperative, courts should regard
it as an impermissible construction”; and (2) “[I]t violates the principle of contract
interpretation preferring ordinary meanings over technical ones. The insurers’ construction
comports with definitions found in ordinary dictionaries and in the common usage of the
words at issue; the plaintiffs’ construction, by contrast, relies on specialized definitions from
insurance law treatises.” Thomas O. Farrish, “Diminished Value” in Automobile Insurance:
The Controversy and Its Lessons, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 39, 60 (2005). But see Katy M. Young,
Comment, Georgia Is a Peach for Insured’s Right to Diminshed Value, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 417,
434-45 (2008) (arguing that Georgia, which awards diminished values of vehicles to insureds
after its decision in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. 2001), has
the right idea). However, these analyses, unlike mine, tend to be contract-based and more
narrowly focused on policy wording alone. My argument is not that such issues should be
decided solely by a reviewing court’s understanding of policy language. Rather, textual
analysis of the policy should be supplemented by appreciation of the insurance-policy-as-
social-instrument perspective to help determine whether the court’s assessment of policy text
is correct and makes legal and practical sense in the larger scheme of insurance as social
institution.
The theory is beguiling and has been accepted in about half of the
jurisdictions with precedent on the issue and, conversely, rejected
in the other half with no precedent.285 But accepting the idea that
auto insurance should pay for diminished post-crash/post-repair
market value runs counter to the social function of auto insurance.
Auto collision insurance is designed to restore a damaged vehicle to
its pre-accident condition. If, after a collision, the insurer pays for
an adequate repair that restores the auto to its prior condition, the
insurance policy has achieved its purpose.286
Imposing on the insurer the additional burden of paying for any
loss of market value the car may have sustained, merely because it
was in an accident, goes beyond the intended social purpose of
collision insurance and turns auto insurance, designed to protect
against the economic consequences of physical damage, into
2010] INSURANCE POLICY AS SOCIAL INSTRUMENT 1563
287. As a general matter, property and casualty insurance is designed to protect against
tangible loss rather than market fluctuations or financial loss. See DORFMAN, supra note 14,
at 353; 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, §§ 1.01, 15.01; TRIESCHMANN ET
AL., supra note 14, at 157-58; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 579-81. For example,
property insurance generally covers only the physical loss to a home rather than any
additional diminution in value because the neighborhood has become less desirable since the
house was originally built. Under the basic general liability policy, a claim alleging that the
policyholder has caused property damage to the plaintiff is covered only if the complaint
alleges “physical injury to tangible property.” 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra
note 4, § 14.01 at 13-15. Prior to the 1966 version of the standard CGL form, the language was
less clear and insurers became upset when court decisions mandated defense or coverage of
intangible property claims. See id. In effect, the insurance industry as a whole expressed a
clear intent to cover physical loss rather than diminished value, at least in most situations,
in the absence of extenuating circumstances.
288. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
(1985); WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE
THREATENS AMERICA’S RULE OF LAW 181-84 (2003).
289. See Roger Parloff, The Tort That Ate the Constitution, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1994, at
74-79. For a recent, less negative view of the asbestos mass tort litigation, see Jeb Barnes, In
Defense of Asbestos Tort Litigation: Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a World of
Uncertainty, Second Bests, and Shared Policy-Making Responsibility, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
5 (2009) (questioning conventional wisdom viewing judicial resolution of asbestos claims as
disastrous and arguing that, although inefficient, litigation is the least bad option for
vindicating rights of victims, in light of the lack of effective legislative or executive action).
290. See Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Triumph and Failure
of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255 (2006) (noting that asbestos litigation of
1970s and 1980s, largely against asbestos manufacturers, was the largest mass tort in
history, leading some to wonder what future mass tort would be the next asbestos and
observing that wave suits in the late 1990s and early 2000s against nonmanufacturers selling
or installing products containing asbestos created a new mass tort so that the “next asbestos”
was asbestos).
something of a price guarantee bond. States that have rejected such
expansions of auto coverage have adopted the better view.287 More
important, they have done so, not only on the basis of contract-
based, product-based, and statutory-based considerations, but also
on the basis of the auto insurance policy’s function as a social
instrument.
E. Trigger of Coverage and the Asbestos Mass Tort
Asbestos has caused injury to victims and their families and
imposed high costs on vendors, insurers, and society.288 Variously
labeled the “tort that ate the constitution”289 and the greatest two
tort crises in history,290 there is no denying the legal, social, and
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291. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980) (applying Illinois and New Jersey law). Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight
Insulations Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mich. 1978), is generally acknowledged to be the first
case of the modern era of protracted, high stakes insurance coverage disputes in which both
insurers and policyholders were represented by top flight coverage counsel. The asbestos
coverage wars continue in this vein. See, e.g., Plastics Eng’g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 759
N.W.2d 613 (Wis. 2009). Both cases involved disputes over trigger and allocation of insurer
responsibilities in connection with asbestos-based suits against policyholders that
manufactured, sold, and distributed asbestos products.
292. For example, in Forty-Eight Insulations the asbestos manufacturer policyholder had
five different insurers over the twenty-one-year time period at issue. Forty-Eight Insulations,
633 F.2d at 1215; see also Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (involving an asbestos maker policyholder with five insurers over nineteen years);
Plastics Eng’g, 759 N.W.2d at 616 (involving thirty-three-year time period of policyholder’s
asbestos manufacture and sale activity, in which insurer at issue wrote primary and excess
CGL coverage for approximately twenty years). 
293. See Stempel, Coverage Carnage, supra note 75, at 376-81 (describing medical aspects
of asbestos injury).
economic impact of the material and the mass tort litigation it
spawned. In addition, of course, it launched a long-running wave of
insurance coverage litigation, some of which still continues, even
though use of asbestos has been banned for more than thirty
years.291
A pivotal issue in the asbestos insurance coverage wars was the
question of when asbestos vendors’ CGL policies were triggered. The
stakes hinging on the answer were large because of the nature of
many asbestos-related injuries. In a not uncommon case, a worker
in a factory, shipyard, or insulation company may have begun
working with the material in Year One, continued working with the
material until Year Twenty, only to be stricken with an asbestos-
related disease in Year Thirty. When the worker or his estate sued
the asbestos vendor, the vendors in turn tendered the matter to
their insurers. Over the course of thirty years, the asbestos vendor
may have purchased coverage from several different companies with
different policy years holding quite different policy limits applicable
to the claims.292 In addition, the particular etiology of asbestos-
related disease created a situation in which it could credibly be
maintained that more than a single policy applied to the claim
because injurious exposure to asbestos could have occurred at
various times or been continuous over the years.293 The question of
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294. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 829 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir.
1987) (applying manifestation trigger to asbestos claims); Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins.
Co. Ltd., 804 F.2d 1325, 1326-27 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); Spinx Oil Co., Inc. v. Federated Mut.
Ins. Co., 427 S.E.2d 649 (S.C. 1993) (same). But see Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d
1034, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (refusing to apply manifestation trigger).
295. See Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1246 (Cal.
1990) (adopting manifestation trigger for first-party property damage insurance coverage).
296. See OLSON, supra note 288, at 186-87.
297. See Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening
Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2045 (2000).
298. See OLSON, supra note 288, at 187-94. In fact, many asbestos manufacturers, most
famously Johns-Manville, did file for bankruptcy. See Resnick, supra note 297, at 2045-46
(2000) (noting financial pressure put on even large businesses by mass tort exposures);
crucial importance then became which insurance policies in which
years were applicable to the claim.
Insurers, although sometimes taking inconsistent positions on the
issue depending on their own exposure in particular cases, tended
to be more comfortable with a “manifestation” trigger applicable
only to those policies in which, in the policy year, the asbestos
victim had tangible symptoms of asbestos-related disease.294 The
manifestation trigger, which dominates first-party property insur-
ance coverage,295 could be applied to most liability-creating events
without difficulty or unfairness. For example, if a patron slips on a
poorly maintained floor at the policyholder’s business premises, the
patron usually suffers immediately manifested injury. The time of
the liability-creating event and its impact on the plaintiff-victim are
contemporaneous. In addition, the victim is unlikely to be badly
injured or to be joined by many other victims facing similar injury
from the peril in question. The contemporaneousness of negligence
and injury also permits the policyholder to quickly become ap-
praised of the situation and to take remedial steps to ensure that
others are not similarly injured.
Asbestos, of course, was different. The victims could ingest the
dangerous materials for years before anyone was aware of their
injuries.296 When the injuries became manifest, the injuries were
not limited to one or two isolated plaintiffs but to multitudes of
victims.297 The resulting cascade of liability was potentially
bankrupting to the policyholder, particularly if the policyholder was
dependent on a single policy to defend the claims and provide
compensation to the plaintiffs.298 Many of the older CGL policies
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Stempel, Coverage Carnage, supra note 75, at 416-40; Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts
Bankruptcies: The Who, the Why and the How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 107 (2004) (“Over
seventy companies are in bankruptcy court as a result of their asbestos exposure.”).
299. See Stempel, Coverage Carnage, supra note 75, at 381-83.
300. See id. at 381-84.
301. Id. at 450-51.
302. See id. at 450-52; see, e.g., Stempel, Domtar Baby, supra note 150, at 775-88
(discussing Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997), and allocation
in pollution cases); see also ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, § 4.07[A]-[C]; OSTRAGER &
NEWMAN, supra note 4, § 9.04[b] (discussing various types of proration used by courts); 2
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 14.10.
303. 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 14.09[B].
304. Stempel, Coverage Carnage, supra note 75, at 399-400.
covering such claims did not have aggregate limits on “pre-
mises/operations” claims but had relatively low per-occurrence
limits.299 Further, perhaps most of the policies did have aggregate
limits on “products/completed operations” claims, which meant that
asbestos manufacturers—as opposed to insulation installers or
vendors merely using asbestos to which others were exposed during
ongoing operations—effectively did have caps on each policy year’s
available coverage.300
In response to this situation, policyholders argued that their CGL
coverage should be triggered for each policy year in which plaintiffs
were injuriously exposed to asbestos or suffered actual injury or
injury-in-fact, even if the injury did not become diagnosable or
manifest until some years later.301 Insurers tended to strongly
oppose use of either an exposure or actual injury trigger unless
they were also permitted to prorate coverage among policy years
that were the responsibility of other insurers or the policyholders
themselves due to self-insurance, failure to purchase insurance, or
because previously purchased insurance was exhausted due to other
claims.302 Most of all, insurers also opposed the idea promoted by
many policyholders that coverage was continuously triggered from
the plaintiff’s first exposure to asbestos through the time that
injuries manifested or became known.303
The history of the asbestos coverage litigation is in large part
the history of policyholders prevailing on the issue. A significant
majority of courts have rejected the manifestation trigger for
asbestos liability claims, notwithstanding its popularity for first-
party property loss claims.304 Most courts have ruled that all policies
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305. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 4.01-4.06; OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 4,
§ 9.03[a]; 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 14.09[B]; Stempel, Coverage
Carnage, supra note 75, at 364-75.
306. 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 14.01[B]
307. See SAWYER, supra note 12, at 11-25; 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note
4, § 14.01[A]; supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
308. See MARK R. GREENE, RISK AND INSURANCE 47-48 (4th ed. 1977) (noting overall size,
strength, and financial health of entire insurance industry and substantial growth during
post-World War II period, which coincides with the introduction of the standard CGL policy);
REJDA, supra note 14, at 303 (quoting senior official of large commercial insurance broker
regarding centrality of general liability insurance for managing business risk); TRIESCHMANN
ET AL., supra note 14, at 197 (“The increasingly litigious nature of our society has made
liability risk a major concern for individuals and businesses in the U.S.... [In addition to other
forms of risk management,] they also spend billions of dollars each year to purchase liability
insurance to protect them if they get sued.”). To a large degree, industry activists like Elmer
Sawyer, an attorney with the National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters, and
John Eglof, a vice-president of Travelers, were correct in predicting that the bundled, broader
insurance product would be easier to sell at a higher premium and that the marketing
beginning with the first injurious exposure to asbestos through
discovery of the injury are triggered, requiring all triggered insurers
to cover the asbestos claim.305 Multiply this score of policy periods,
hundreds of insurers, and more than a million claimants and the
result is a lot of implicated insurance, particularly in cases in
which the products/completed operations aggregate limits were not
applicable. Although the standard CGL form has, since 1986, con-
tained both an asbestos exclusion and aggregate limits for prem-
ise/operations liability as well,306 the insurance industry has been
forced to pay far more than desired on asbestos claims due to the
courts’ adoption of injurious exposure, actual injury, or continuous
triggers of CGL coverage.
Although one may be sympathetic to the insurers’ plight, the
broad triggers applied to CGL policies in such cases is almost
certainly correct when one takes a sufficiently broad view of liability
insurance not only as a contract, or a product or statute, but also as
a social instrument or risk management institution designed to fill
a particular social and commercial role. As noted above, the CGL
policy was an industry-crafted package of broad coverage designed
to make sale, underwriting, and pricing of liability insurance more
attractive to commercial policyholders and more profitable for
insurers.307 Notwithstanding the asbestos coverage imbroglio, the
CGL has been an economic winner for insurers.308 More important
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benefits of the policy would outweigh the broader risks undertaken through this product.
SAWYER, supra note 12, at 11-25; Eglof, supra note 214, at 20. Bundling coverage probably
helped by reducing adverse selection by forcing policyholders to purchase a general insurance
product rather than cherry-picking only the coverages they were most likely to need and
forcing policyholders to pay an omnibus bundled, larger premium. Although insurers, most
infamously AIG, have faced tough economic times, this downturn is not a result of
underwriting or claims problems, but instead stems from the sale of risky financial products
coupled with poor performance on premium dollars invested. 
309. 2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 14.01[B]
310. Using reinsurance, insurers purchase insurance for part or all of the risks they have
assumed by selling insurance policies. Retrocession is the further purchase of insurance by
reinsurers. See DORFMAN, supra note 14, at 407-12; REJDA, supra note 14, at 593-98; 2
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 17.01; TRIESCHMANN ET AL., supra note
14, at 488-91; VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 14, at 146.
311. Stempel, Coverage Carnage, supra note 75, at 363.
312. That is, the insurers shouldered the cost in terms of the availability of insurance
coverage under several policies. As a whole, however, insurers have done better than asbestos
from the social instrument perspective, the CGL has become an
integral cog in the machinery of commercial risk management. Each
policy is designed to provide adequate general liability protection to
the policyholder.309 In return for required premium payment, risk is
shifted from the policyholder to the insurer, who in turn further
spreads the risk among reinsurers and retrocessionaires.310 The
resulting quilt of coverage is one in which the policyholder, if hit
with an unexpected wave of liability claims, will generally have
protection absent wrongdoing, at least up to applicable policy limits.
Seen in this light, the exposure, actual injury, and continuous
triggers of CGL policies purchased by asbestos vendor policyholders
all make perfect sense. The nature of asbestos-related injury was
both latent and long-tailed in a manner not typically seen. The
policyholders had purchased liability insurance to protect them-
selves against liability risks. The nature of the insurance arrange-
ment is one in which insurers took on the contingency of unknown
risk for a price, the chance that the policyholder could face substan-
tial liability by way of factual or legal events not anticipated at the
time the policy was issued. Although both policyholders and liability
insurers failed to anticipate the asbestos mass tort, it was the
insurers who took on this risk.311 When the unforeseen tort led to
unforeseen applications of the trigger aspects of the policies, it was
properly the insurers rather than the policyholders who shouldered
the unexpectedly adverse consequences.312
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policyholders. See id. at 440-42. Over the three decades of the asbestos mass only a few
liability insurers have failed, fewer still because of their asbestos coverage burdens. By
contrast, scores of asbestos policyholders have filed for bankruptcy, with most disappearing
as operative businesses. See id. at 416-18.
313. This very situation served as the basis for discussion in Leslie A. Bradshaw,
Annotation, Suicide as Compensable Under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 15 A.L.R. 3d 616
(1967 & Supp. 2008).
314. See, e.g., In re Sponatski, 108 N.E. 466, 467-68 (Mass. 1915) (holding that a suicide is
compensable only if it was the direct result of a workplace injury); State v. Ramsey, 839 P.2d
936, 939 (Wyo. 1992) (observing that Sponatski was once followed by eleven, but now only five,
states).
315. See, e.g., Indus. Comm’n of Ohio v. Brubaker, 196 N.E. 409, 412 (Ohio 1935).
The broad view of policy trigger implicates many insurance
policies over many years, but policyholders faced huge liability
claims and paid premiums for the coverage in question throughout
those same years. The CGL policy properly fills its socioeconomic
institutional role in cases in which an actual injury or continuous
trigger is applied. There is no unfairness to insurers and no sound
jurisprudential theory in favor of restricting coverage to a single
policy year unless the text of the policy itself, or some other
indicia of intent or purpose, supports such restriction. The judicial
preference for a broad, policyholder-friendly approach to trigger
in the asbestos cases was justified not only by contract-based
arguments based on text, resolution of ambiguity against policy
drafters, intent, purpose, and the like, but also had a sound basis
under an insurance-policy-as-social-instrument theory. Appreciating
the application of this view strengthens the contract-based analyses
of most courts and confirms the correctness of their approaches.
F. Workers’ Compensation and Post-Injury Employee Suicide
Should workers’ compensation insurance cover a worker’s suicide
following a painful, disabling workplace injury?313 Injured workers
may experience such pain or depression after a job-related injury
that they take their own lives. For some time, there was doubt as to
whether these resulting suicides were sufficiently work-related to
be within coverage.314 Insurance carrier counsel regularly argued
that the worker’s suicide was either a separate, superseding cause
of the loss that was not sufficiently connected to the workplace,315
was not covered because the suicide did not physically occur while
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316. See, e.g., Schell v. Buell ECD Co., 690 P.2d 1038, 1040 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
317. What generally goes by the name of workers’ compensation insurance is usually
technically sold as an “employers’ liability” insurance. The workers’ compensation statutes
in the respective states require that employers, unless exempt, purchase insurance that will
compensate workers injured on the job according to a pre-determined schedule of benefits. See
generally 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 1 (2003). In many states, the state is also
the provider of the insurance policy, whereas in others, private carriers regularly sell the
coverage. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 60-61; LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, at 742;
LITTLE ET AL., supra note 19, at 66-67; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Judge-Made Insurance
That Was Not on the Menu: Schmidt v. Smith and the Confluence of Text, Expectation, and
Public Policy in the Realm of Employment Practices Liability, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 283,
296-322 (1999) [hereinafter Stempel, Judge-Made Insurance] (explaining employers’
liability/workers’ compensation insurance and distinguishing it from employment practices
liability insurance (EPL), which is designed primarily to protect employers from
discrimination and harassment litigation pursuant to the civil rights statutes). 
EPL insurance is a relatively recent innovation and during its early years was considered
to have high premium costs relative to its scope. Stempel, Judge-Made Insurance, supra, at
314. In recent years, however, the market for EPL insurance has broadened, and it now
appears to have become an example of insurance as social instrument, albeit a less important
one than workers’ compensation, general liability, or property coverage. Id.
318. See, e.g., In re Schofield v. White, 95 N.W.2d 40, 41-42, 46 (Iowa 1959); Sponatski, 108
N.E. at 467-68; Anderson v. Armour & Co., 101 N.W.2d 435, 439-40 (Minn. 1960);
Konazewaska v. Erie R.R. Co., 45 A.2d 315, 315 (N.J. 1945); Indus. Comm’n v. Brubaker, 196
N.E. 409 (Ohio 1935). This traditional “voluntary willful choice” test treated suicide as a break
in the causal chain linking work and injury unless the worker committed suicide while
gripped with an uncontrollable impulse. See Sponatski, 108 N.E. at 467-68. In a sign of the
fading authority of that approach, Massachusetts has legislatively modified and largely
overruled the Sponatski decision. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, § 20.07. In addition,
there has arisen what is sometimes termed the “New York rule” that requires some physical
injury to the brain if suicide is to be considered insufficiently involuntary to merit workers’
compensation coverage. See Food Distribs. v. Estate of Ball, 485 S.E.2d 155, 159 n.1 (Va. Ct.
App. 1997) (citing State v. Ramsey, 839 P.2d 936, 940 (Wyo. 1992)) (noting but not following
this approach). Finally, the “English rule” requires that to be covered a suicide must be the
direct result of the injury itself coming as a shock to the worker rather than “brooding” over
the injury and its impact. Id. (noting but rejecting rule; observing that English rule, like New
York rule, is “rarely, if ever, applied”); see also Bradshaw, supra note 313, at 621-31.
the decedent was at work or acting within the scope of his or her
employment,316 or was the type of intentionally inflicted injury that
fell outside the basic employers’ liability policy purchased pursuant
to the workers’ compensation requirements established in all
states.317
During the first few decades of the workers’ compensation system,
which began during the early twentieth century, insurers had some
success with this argument.318 Beginning mid-century, workers’
estates began winning these cases, with courts ruling that such
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319. See, e.g., Estate of Jenkins v. Recchi Am., 658 So. 2d 157, 158-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995); Wells v. Harrell, 714 S.W.2d 498, 501-02 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Campbell v. Young Motor
Co., 684 P.2d 1101, 1102-03 (Mont. 1984); Schell v. Buell ECD Co., 690 P.2d 1038, 1041-43
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Stroer v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 672 P.2d 1158, 1160-62 (Okla. 1983); Food
Distribs., 485 S.E.2d at 158-62; Hall v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 303 S.E.2d 726 (W.
Va. 1983); see also Bradshaw, supra note 313, at 621-32.
320. Bradshaw, supra note 313, at 637-39.
321. The workers’ compensation liability scheme differs from that of tort law. Workers’
compensation statutes came into vogue during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century as an alternative to tort litigation for injured workers. See ABRAHAM, supra note 11,
at 52-55. Workers were relieved of the burden of proving employer fault and instead needed
only to show that the injury was job-related and not intentionally inflicted. Employers in turn
benefited from caps on the amounts paid out in compensation for injury or death according
to an established schedule rather than the potentially idiosyncratic views of a particular jury.
Nonetheless, workers’ compensation or industrial accident insurance claims can be hotly
litigated, often concerning issues of whether an employee brought about the injury through
willful misconduct or by self-infliction in order to collect benefits. 
322. See Bradshaw, supra note 313, at 621.
323. See Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS & Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 188 P.3d 1088, 1088-
90 (Nev. 2008) (citing LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
LAW § 38.02; MODERN WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW § 115:5 (1993)).
deaths were sufficiently work-related to fall within coverage and
that the decedents’ suicides were not the type of misconduct, willful
acts of self-injury, or separate, intervening actions that negated the
workplace origins of the injury.319 Although the decisions are not
unanimous and the question remains open in some jurisdictions,320
the tide has clearly turned in favor of considering injury-related
suicides to be work-related losses subject to workers’ compensation
coverage.321
In deciding whether the suicide of an injured worker falls within
or outside the scope of coverage, most jurisdictions have come to
hold that suicide is not a per se bar to recovery.322 But states are
divided on the test for determining the circumstances under which
suicide may preclude coverage. A minority of states follow a “volun-
tary willful choice” test that essentially requires the deceased
worker to have been insane or unable to control suicidal impulses,
while the majority of states follow a chain-of-causation test that
considers suicide deaths compensable if the suicide results from an
“unbroken chain of causation between an industrial injury and the
employee’s eventual suicide.”323
The issue remains open in some jurisdictions. Under the majority
rule approach, suicide is not a per se bar to receipt of benefits and
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324. See id. at 1089-90; see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 399 P.2d 664,
668 (Ariz. 1965); Lead v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 796 A.2d 431, 436 n.14 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2002).
325. In Vredenburg, worker Danny Vredenburg, a bartender at the Flamingo Hilton-
Laughlin, slipped on a flight of stairs and suffered a severe back injury while working.
Vredenburg, 188 P.3d at 1086. There was no dispute that the injury was compensable under
the hotel’s policy and he began to receive benefits. Id. Unfortunately, despite treatment, he
experienced severe neck and lower back pain resulting from “internal disc derangement at
several locations along his spine.” His treatment included a “360-degree anterior-posterior
fusion surgery,” pain medication, therapy, epidural steroid injections, and implantation of a
morphine infusion pump in his spine. Id. Despite this, the pain continued to be “intractable”
according to his doctor, who also noted that Danny had become “psychologically de-stabilized”
and completely disabled. Id. at 1086-87. Observers noted a deterioration in his mood, weight
loss, and great difficulty walking. Danny eventually shot himself in the head. Id. at 1086.
When his widow sought workers’ compensation death benefits, the Flamingo’s insurance
administrator rejected the claim. Sharon Vredenburg continued to prosecute the claim but lost
again before a hearing officer and an appeals officer. Id. The Supreme Court of Nevada
reversed and remanded the matter, essentially providing a roadmap and directive to award
benefits.
326. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616C.230(l) (West 2008).
327. An appeals officer’s factual decision in a workers’ compensation matter is reviewed
under a “clear error” or “abuse of discretion” standard in which the officer’s “fact-based
conclusions of law are entitled to deference and will not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence”; the court accepts the evidentiary record without substituting its
judgment for that of the appeals officer as to the weight of the evidence. Vredenberg, 188 P.3d
at 1087. “Pure questions of law, however,” are reviewed de novo. Id. at 1088 (footnotes
omitted). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable person could accept as
adequately supporting a conclusion.” See Manwill v. Clark County, 162 P.3d 876, 879 n.4
(Nev. 2007) (citing Ayala v. Caesar’s Palace, 71 P.3d 490, 491 (2003)). Because the appeals
officer in Vredenburg had either failed to use the chain-of-causation test or misapplied it, the
case was remanded. Vredenberg, 188 P.3d at 1092.
the family of a deceased worker can recover if it is shown that (1)
the employee suffered an industrial injury, (2) that the injury
caused a psychological condition severe enough to override the
employee’s rational judgment, and (3) the psychological condition
caused the employee to commit suicide.324 This chain-of-causation
test in essence provides industrial insurance benefits to workers
who take their own lives because of severe pain or depression
causally related to a workplace injury.325 The exclusion for willful
self-injury provided by statute326 and contained in most employers’
liability policies does not automatically preclude benefits if a worker
commits suicide in the aftermath of a work-related injury. The
suicide may be covered depending on whether the claimant satisfies
the chain-of-causation test outlined above.327
2010] INSURANCE POLICY AS SOCIAL INSTRUMENT 1573
In addition, although the court’s review focused on errors of law and the lower court’s
articulation the apt test for assessing death by suicide claims, its opinion quite clearly takes
issue with the appeals officer’s apparent view that Sharon Vredenburg had not supplied
sufficient evidence of the relationship between Danny’s severe back injury and the pain and
depression that drove him to suicide.
[W]e conclude that substantial evidence does not support the appeals officer’s
finding of fact that Danny’s “suicide constituted a deliberate decision on his
part,” which suggests that the appeals officer concluded that Danny’s suicide
must have stemmed from a source other than his industrial injury. Notably, the
record before the appeals officer contained [his physicians’ evaluations] ... and
the affidavits of multiple friends and coworkers, which together implicate many
of the hallmarks of a compensable suicide under the chain-of-causation test: an
irreversible injury, unrelenting pain, a possible psychoactive reaction to
prescribed medication, and extreme depression....
In contrast to Vredenburg, the Flamingo presented little, if any, evidence to
counter the causal narrative displayed by Vredenburg’s evidence.
See id. at 1091. Thus, although the case was remanded to the appeals officer “for proceedings
consistent with the standard announced in this opinion,” id. at 1092, the court essentially held
Danny’s death eligible for workers’ compensation benefits unless the Flamingo could present
persuasive evidence to the contrary on remand.
328. See In re Sponatski, 108 N.E. 466, 468 (Mass. 1915).
329. Vredenburg, 188 P.3d at 1088 (citing LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 38.02[2], at 38-5 (2007)).
330. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, at 494.
An alternative test for determining whether worker suicide falls
within coverage is a “voluntary willful choice” criterion. Associated
with an old Massachusetts case,328 this test in modern form allows
compensation for worker suicide after injury “only if [the suicide]
(1) resulted from an uncontrollable impulse or delirium of frenzy,
and (2) occurred without the employee’s knowledge of the physical
consequences of his or her actions.”329 If either the first prong
(volition) or the second prong (understanding) is not met, the suicide
is viewed as an intervening act that breaks the connection between
the worker’s injury and his death.330 The two-pronged willful choice
test essentially requires the deceased worker to have been insane
(unable to understand) or unable to control his actions.
Nevada only definitively decided this issue in 2008, following the
majority view in a case with heart-rending but hardly unusual facts.
In Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS & Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, the
court held that suicide by an injured worker was not, as a matter of
law, willful self-inflicted injury and did not automatically bar
recovery of the death benefits ordinarily available in cases of
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331. 188 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Nev. 2008).
332. Id. at 1089-90.
333. Id. at 1090.
334. Id. at 1089; see, e.g., Schwab v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 459 P.2d 1, 6 (Wash. 1969);
see also LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, § 38.02.
335. See Vredenburg, 188 P.3d at 1089. The seminal case enunciating and applying the
chain-of-causation is Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 399 P.2d
664 (Ariz. 1965). “[T]he chain-of-causation test accords with the basic policy of this state’s
workers’ compensation scheme: to deliver ‘economic assistance to persons who suffer disability
or death as a result of their employment,’ regardless of fault, in exchange for limiting the tort
liability of employers.” See Vredenburg, 188 P.3d at 1090 (citing Gallagher v. City of Las
Vegas, 959 P.2d 519, 521 (Nev. 1998); Hansen v. Harrah’s, 675 P.2d 394, 397 (Nev. 1984)). 
workplace-related death.331 The court also adopted the chain-of-
causation test used by the bulk of courts, which does not automati-
cally bar workers’ compensation benefits in such cases.332
In reviewing the case law, the Vredenburg court found over-
whelming support for the pro-coverage side of the controversy. One
need not be crazy or completely stripped of free will to be driven to
suicide by the pain and related problems caused by a severe
workplace injury. As noted in Vredenburg, the willful choice test
also improperly introduces elements of fault into workers’ compen-
sation law.333 The court observed that, because of problems with the
willful choice test, even jurisdictions that purportedly adopt it have
modified it to relax the first prong (volition) and to “practically
eliminate” the second prong (understanding).334 By contrast, the
Nevada Supreme Court found the chain-of-causation test more
consistent with the nature of the workers’ compensation system,
constituting both a better rule and the majority rule.335 In
Vredenburg, a unanimous en banc court correctly aligned the state
with the majority of jurisdictions in taking a sounder approach to
the question of suicide’s impact on receipt of workers’ compensation
benefits.
Although justice was done in the case, which was correct as a
matter of statutory and insurance policy interpretation, it remains
more than a little disturbing that the widow of the dead worker was
forced to prosecute the case to the state’s highest court after her late
husband’s employer, a hearing officer, and an appeals officer denied
benefits. The case is clearly one in which the injured worker did not
improperly “choose” to injure himself in order to extract undeserved
benefits from his employer and its insurance carrier. There was no
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336. See Vredenburg, 188 P.3d at 1086-87. Contrast Mrs. Vredenburg’s arduous path to
relief to that of worker Kenneth Ball’s widow ten years earlier in Virginia. See Food Distribs.
v. Estate of Ball, 485 S.E.2d 155 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). Both the original hearing officer and the
state review board found coverage even though Mr. Ball’s suicide came more than five years
after the workplace accident, a trip-and-fall that badly injured his shoulder, causing chronic
nerve pain and limitations in use. Id. at 157-58. The state’s high court merely affirmed rather
than overturned the state’s administrative apparatus. By contrast, the Nevada administrative
system seemed to want to live in the early twentieth century in its embrace of the now largely
discredited “voluntary willful choice” test. Of course, both Mr. Vredenburg’s employer and Mr.
Ball’s insisted on requiring their widows to litigate the issue to the maximum possible extent,
a troubling reflection on the motivational matrix of employers in what was supposed to be a
kinder, gentler system of injury compensation. 
337. See LITTLE ET AL., supra note 19, at 74 (“In the real world of workers’ compensation
... theoretical niceties often give way to political realities.”); see also JACK B. HOOD ET AL.,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYEE PROTECTION LAWS 133-38 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing
proposed reforms to workers’ compensation that have obtained varying degrees of success);
2 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 4, § 21.07 (“[W]orkers’ compensation law
is also often a politically salient issue engaging important business and labor groups.”).
338. See LITTLE ET AL., supra note 19, at 73-74 (observing that, although there is general
agreement on the goals of workers compensation system, employers, workers, the public, and
dispute that the worker was badly injured in a workplace injury and
there was overwhelming evidence of the connection between that
injury, its pain, and the failed treatment of the pain to lead to an
inference that Vrendenburg experienced a reaction to pain medica-
tion that affected his mental faculties.336 If this was not a case
meriting workers’ compensation benefits after suicide, it is hard to
imagine any case that would qualify. 
Why, then, was there so much resistance to the claim, at least
prior to review by the Nevada Supreme Court? One disturbing
possibility is that longstanding concern about holding the line on
industrial insurance premiums and fostering a good business cli-
mate for employers has created an atmosphere unduly resistant to
workers’ claims.337 But hardline resistance to worker suicide claims
is also unlikely to make much fiscal difference. Comparatively few
injured workers commit suicide and, when they do, the death
benefit, although of course important to the widow or widower and
family, is unlikely to make any difference to the overall fiscal health
of the insurance system or the business climate. Nonetheless,
because of its centrality to American business and the American
workplace, workers’ compensation is of major economic, political,
and social importance, making it a frequent topic of interest
group and legislative concern.338 Employers’ liability insurance is
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insurance as social instrument and social institution and is subject
to more than “mere” contract-based assessment.
Like the majority of decisions, the Nevada Supreme Court’s
assessment in Vredenburg seems correct and is appropriately
reached through a contract-based analysis of the coverage dispute.
However, bringing to bear the insights of a social instrument
perspective makes the correctness of the pro-coverage position even
clearer in such circumstances. If better appreciated by administra-
tive tribunals and lower courts, the realization that workers’
compensation coverage is a social instrument rather than a mere
piece of paper documenting a contract might have avoided the
protracted litigation that finally placed Nevada in the majority rule
column of states regarding worker suicide.
As reflected in the Mississippi police station example, workers’
compensation insurance is a legal requirement as well as a practical
necessity for responsible employers.339 Most businesses will not
operate without workers’ compensation coverage in place and state
authorities will shut down businesses operating without the
statutorily required coverage, requiring rectification and inflicting
financial penalties.340 Workers’ compensation insurance, despite
those legal and social policy criticisms that may be properly leveled
at it, is part of the basic fabric of economic life.341
The importance of insurance to everyday economic and social
functioning does not, of course, require that the insurance in place
be deemed applicable to every loss. There may be good socioeco-
nomic reasons why noncoverage and nonpayment are more consis-
tent with the proper role and functioning of the insurance policy at
issue. However, in the case of the employee driven to suicide by the
aftermath of a workplace injury, the social role of the insurance
policy strongly supports the prevailing judicial norm of holding such
deaths to be sufficiently workplace-related to qualify for coverage.
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345. Contra Scales, supra note 63, at 1263:
From a modern standpoint, workers’ compensation seems to create significant
under-deterrence relative to tort liability. Compensation awards are
partial—they replace only a portion of wages and offer nothing at all for
noneconomic damages. Thus it is easy to assume that workers’ compensation
does not result in optimal rates of accident prevention.
At the time of adoption, however, workers’ compensation promised significantly more liability
than employers had experienced under the parsimonious tort law of the times.
346. For example, maximum disability and death benefits available through workers’
compensation can vary dramatically between states, although the most common formula is
two-thirds of the worker’s average weekly wage up to a statutory or administrative maximum.
In 2003, New York’s maximum was $400 per week, Georgia’s $425, but New Hampshire’s
maximum could reach $1018. See LITTLE, ET AL., supra note 19, at 391-92. But even in the
most munificent jurisdictions, the amounts awarded are far less than what would be
Recall that the workers’ compensation system came into existence
as an alternative to a tort law system that was problematic for both
employers and employees.342 During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, workers faced an unfavorable tort system, which
included defenses such as the fellow servant rule, denying recovery
when the injury was the fault of a co-worker, and contributory
negligence, a doctrine which, at the time, denied recovery to an
injured worker who was even slightly at fault in bringing about his
or her injury.343 The workers’ compensation laws replaced the then
employer-friendly tort system with one of strict liability; if a worker
was injured on the job, he or she was entitled to benefits according
to a set schedule.344
Today, we see this tradeoff (strict liability for caps on damages)
as a roughly equivalent compromise of employer and employee
interests. But in the early twentieth century, this was not a tradeoff
but a great victory for workers. Formidable barriers to liability were
removed and, at that time, the schedule of benefits was munificent
as compared to typical jury awards in tort cases.345 But during the
ensuing century, legislatures largely refused to index the benefits
schedule for inflation and have updated award rates only episodi-
cally, resulting in a situation in which workers’ compensation
awards, even for serious injuries (or perhaps especially for serious
injuries), seem meager when compared to comparable tort awards.346
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recovered in a comparable tort action or the amounts that would be paid pursuant to a
reasonably good first-party insurance policy. In 2003, maximum payment to a Tennessee
worker who lost a hand was $89,850 for permanent partial disability; in South Carolina, the
maximum limit for total disability was payment of wage replacement formula for a maximum
of 500 weeks or less than 10 years while in Illinois such benefits were available for the life of
the worker. See id. at 392-93. In addition, some states terminate death benefits to a surviving
spouse that remarries, a limitation never placed on tort awards or first-party insurance
proceeds. See id. at 477 (“Most workers’ compensation statutes terminate a surviving spouse’s
weekly death benefits upon remarriage.”). 
347. Another unintended consequence of workers’ compensation and its protection of
employers from tort liability has been the drive by plaintiffs to recover damages against
manufacturers of workplace products to gain additional compensation beyond the oft-
inadequate workers’ compensation payment schedule. While many of these claims have been
well-taken, many others have been strained or even frivolous but made nonetheless because
greater recovery against the employer, who is often the primary culprit in workplace injuries,
is foreclosed. See Scales, supra note 63, at 1264-65 (noting that workers’ compensation has
not been effective in increasing workplace safety or deterring accidents).
348. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, at 569.
Another part of the tradeoff, of course, was that in return for the
protections afforded by workers’ compensation, employees were
stripped of the right to sue in tort. A workers’ compensation claim
became the exclusive legal remedy against an employer, no matter
how negligent the employer’s conduct and no matter how unsafe the
workplace.347 Thus, workers were in a position similar to investors
who sold a growth stock too early. They missed out completely on
the bull market in tort liability that took place for most of the
century.
But whatever its flaws or unintended consequences, workers’
compensation clearly was intended and designed to operate as the
primary social safety net for workers and their families if the
worker was injured on the job. Although the establishment of
Social Security thirty years later and the adoption of other social
welfare programs, for example, Medicare and Medicaid, still later
in the century spread the burden, workers’ compensation remains
a pillar of government-mandated economic and social protection
for workers. Because the program operates by statutorily man-
dating that employers purchase insurance, the resulting employers’
liability policies share contract, statute, and social instrument
characteristics.348 Simply put, the workers’ compensation policy is
designed to provide a reliable and adequate means of replacing a
significant portion of an injured worker’s lost income, even if it is
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not effective in fully compensating the injured worker (or his or her
family in the case of workplace related death).349
Appreciating workers’ compensation insurance as a socioeconomic
instrument and institution makes the case for covering post-injury
suicides like that of Vredenburg even stronger and confirms the
correctness of Vredenburg and the majority of judicial decisions in
such cases. So long as a worker’s suicide can be fairly traced to the
consequences of workplace injury, covering the suicide is completely
consistent with the purpose of the workers’ compensation system
and employers’ liability insurance sold as part of that system. The
decedent’s family is not given a gratuity, but rather receives the
type of compensation families were intended to receive in the event
of the death of a worker.
Providing benefits in such circumstances presents insurers little
concern over adverse selection, moral hazard, or other insurer risks
in attempting to design policies or protect risk pools.350 Assuming
that the causal connection is not overly attenuated, there is no
concern that the decedent sought work as a means of procuring
insurance to benefit his family in the aftermath of a planned
suicide. Certainly, nearly every worker sufficiently values his or her
person such that there is adequate worker incentive to use care
simply to avoid the pain, inconvenience, and debilitation of injury,
an incentive that grows logically stronger when the consequences
of a mistake at work are death rather than a broken ankle and a
couple weeks at home catching up on television programming. 
Similarly, there is no serious argument that an injured worker
disappointed in the benefits received for the injury will take his life
simply to procure somewhat higher benefits for his or her surviving
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family. Most of all, there is no danger to the risk pool sufficient to
support ending benefits when a worker’s injuries have contributed
to suicide. Such an argument, in effect, contends that the worker’s
family should be denied the planned benefits of the system because
the worker was unable to cope with the consequences of the injury.
In a prudent system of social insurance, the social instrument
aspect of the insurance counsels in exactly the opposite direction.
After injury-related suicide, the worker’s family needs more pro-
tection, not less. Any result other than that reached in Vredenburg
turns the social institution of workers compensation on its head, a
fact that makes the correctness of the decision clear. 
In addition, were there no workers’ compensation system, rele-
gating the worker to the tort system, modern tort law likely would
have no problem concluding that, if an employer is responsible for
the initial painful or disfiguring injury, the employer is responsible
for all proximate damages, including death by suicide, so long as
causation is proven. And, as discussed above, for most injured
workers and their families, a successful tort claim will provide
considerably more compensation than payment of comparable
workers’ compensation benefits. 
Under these circumstances, denying the decedent’s family death
benefits because of suicide would be particularly antithetical to the
socioeconomic aspects of insurance as a social instrument. What was
intended as great protection for workers and improvement on the
tort system would instead give an injury-victim-cum-decedent
considerably fewer rights than he, or his estate and family, would
have held in the absence of the workers’ compensation scheme and
the liability policy purchased by his employer. Consequently, de-
nying coverage for post-injury suicide in cases such as Vredenburg
would clearly run counter to the collective legal and lay understand-
ing of insurance as a social instrument designed to work in concert
with other aspects of the socioeconomic system. 
CONCLUSION: THE NET BENEFITS OF PRUDENT USE OF THE SOCIAL
INSTRUMENT PERSPECTIVE
According to the clearly established rules of the jurisprudential
road, an insurance policy is a contract. But as the preceding
discussion has shown, appreciating the social instrument function
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of insurance policies provides substantial insight into their proper
construction. In many instances, viewing insurance policies in their
capacity as social instruments confirms the assessment of well-
reasoned contract-based analysis, serving as a useful check on the
accuracy of the contract-driven analysis. In other situations, taking
the social instrument perspective on insurance policies calls into
question the soundness of much traditional contract analysis and
can serve as a useful “second opinion” or alarm that should prompt
courts to reconsider their contractually driven constructions. As a
general rule, an insurance-policy-as-contract analysis is likely to be
correct only when it is consistent with an insurance policy-as-social-
instrument analysis. The design and sale of insurance policies, like
the crafting of legislation, is a purposive enterprise seeking to
achieve established goals and to fulfill a function. Therefore correct
contract analysis logically should be consistent with the social
instrument function of insurance.
Contract purists may resist any supplementation of contract-
based analysis on conceptual grounds. But only a purist blind to
empirical reality could contend that the characterization of insur-
ance policies as social policies is unreasonable in view of the
widespread role of insurance in modern life and commerce.
Contractarians might also resist applying the social instrument
perspective on procedural grounds, contending that the additional
value conveyed from social instrument-based analysis is not worth
the extra time and judicial resources consumed. Although all ana-
lytic activity carries with it some “cost of production,” a cost-benefit
argument against using social instrument analysis is unpersuasive.
In “easy” cases, which comprise the vast bulk of coverage disputes,
use of the social instrument perspective will require little in the way
of judicial resources because the analysis will be relatively short and
the results clear. But using this relatively inexpensive additional bit
of assessment can confirm the court’s contractual assessment or
serve as a warning when contract-based assessment has missed the
mark. In “hard” cases, the correct contractarian analysis is by
definition less than crystal clear. In such cases, the additional
incremental time and effort devoted to a social instrument analysis
is well-justified as part of the typically increased costs of resolving
more complex and difficult disputes. 
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To a large degree, construction of insurance policies and other
instruments through the lens of the social instrument perspective
has been a longstanding feature of contract disputes and all legal
disputes. Historically, it has traveled under the nomenclature of
“public policy” or “public values.” To a significant extent, the system
has long permitted judges to inject factors other than contract text
or specific party intent in the process of saying what a contract
means. However, decisionmaking based on a single judge’s invoca-
tion of his or her understanding of the greater good has always left
the system uncomfortable, particularly where judges are not elected
or otherwise responsive to public reaction to their decisions. 
By contrast, interpreting insurance policies by reference to their
socioeconomic role requires the court to make an empirically based
assessment of the nature of the insurance policy in dispute and the
role of that policy or its archetype. These assessments in turn
inform the court as to the relative strength of the disputing parties’
contractual arguments, enabling the court to provide objectively
better insurance policy construction while avoiding the risk that the
decision will turn on “what the judge had for breakfast.” Assessing
insurance policies as social instruments is not the unguided exercise
of personal preferences that some find in public policy pronounce-
ments by the judge. Rather, it flows from an objective appreciation
of the manner in which insurance policies are designed to fill certain
parts of the fabric of commercial and consumer activity.
Properly assessed and deployed, the insurance policy as social
instrument factor provides a valuable additional tool for determin-
ing insurance policy meaning and resolving coverage questions. It
complements rather than supplants traditional contract analysis
and cautions against the errors that result when a narrow contract
analysis misleads a judge into focusing too myopically on policy text,
extrinsic evidence of intent, or party expectations in construing
policies.
